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ABSTRACT 
 The thesis examines the past and present ties between U.S. military thought as 
expressed in combat doctrine and the imagined and historical reality of war in Europe to 
examine how the use and abuse of military history within the genesis of U.S. military 
doctrine and thought has occurred. The thesis surveys the course of U.S. defense strategy 
as it has related to Europe, and specifically how it has engaged with the record of German 
military history, thought, and myth as channeled via the writings, interpretations, and 
misinterpretations of Carl von Clausewitz and the historical record of the Wehrmacht 
within the mirror of U.S. military doctrine in the 20th century. The thesis concludes that 
U.S. military thought and the history of war in Europe are connected via an international 
process of challenge and response wherein U.S. military planners have often looked to 
the record of European war to extract ready-made tactical and operational practices 
seemingly suited to solve pressing military challenges. The thesis also concludes that 
U.S. military thought has adopted various decontextualized concepts from Clausewitz’s 
On War in a manner that obscures a more historic perspective toward the material that, in 
turn, better prepares the reader to engage with more polemical and flawed critiques of the 
Prussian and his work. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 18th century, the profession of the soldier has grown in ambition and 
impact in government and society amid a constant preparation for war as well as, especially 
in the recent past, a constant assessment of what the past and present bode for the future. 
One can call this process military thought, and as such, those who engage in this effort 
should be especially aware of the historical, political, and cultural context of ideas about 
“how to fight” and the higher purposes of war and military organization. In the 21st 
century, this process is not as well studied as in former times, while, at the same time, there 
is more military thought being exercised than perhaps ever before. From the origins of 
more or less modern military thought and education in the 18th century—and present—
U.S. military planners have looked to Europe to think about how to fight.1 American 
appreciation of the tactical and operational success on land of German military planning in 
Europe and Eurasia during 1939–1941 drove U.S. interest in adopting German forms of 
combat as tactics and operations, despite the recent memory of how this doctrine served 
the illiberal politics of operationalized plunder and extermination under National 
Socialism. American military planners also looked to the history of European colonial 
warfare in order to generate doctrine applicable to the more recent wars in Southwest Asia.    
 
1 See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973) 80–85 for the integration of translations of French 
military theory, to include de Vernon and Jomini, into the U.S. Military Academy curriculum in the 19th 
century; see also Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 23 for the influence of the image of Napoleonic conflict on pre-Civil War U.S. 
strategists, 24–25 for the interest that U.S. Army engineers took in the role of fortifications during the 
Crimean War in 1854–1856, and 49–50 for U.S. Army officer Emory Upton’s application of German 
military organizational tenets to U.S. Army organizational planning after the Civil War; see also John I. 
Alger, The Quest for Victory (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982) 51–55 for discussion on how translations 
of Jomini’s military maxims filtered into the U.S. military discourse during and after the Civil War; see 
Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12–2: Infantry in Battle (2d ed. Washington, D.C.: 
Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps) as an example of how U.S. military thought looked to the tactical history 
of the First World War through the lens numerous small-unit tactical case studies rooted in the American 
and Allied experience on the Western Front; and Peter Paret, “Napoleon and the Revolution in War,” in 
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), 138–141 for how generations of Western soldiers looked to the historical example 
of Napoleon in order to glean some insight into the nature of war and battle. 
2 
A number of scholars have taken a critical approach towards the legacy of military history 
centered in historical narratives that laud German Wehrmacht tactical and operational 
acumen and European colonial warfighting and have categorized these accompanying 
narratives as mythic and also as legend.2 This research strives to illuminate how U.S. 
military thought has considered the complex historical record of European war and how 
U.S. military thought has, at times, incorporated selective, biased, and mythical historical 
narratives and excluded historical facts. The key question of this research is:   
How has European military history, military thought and combat doctrine, and 
military myth shaped U.S. military thought and combat doctrine? 
This thesis considers European military history, that is, more or less the sum of 
strategic thought and operational practices since the 18th century to consist of the record 
of, as Michael Howard writes,  those “complicated and disagreeable realities” that 
illuminate “what really happened.”3 Moreover, the general method of the thesis seeks to 
align with that put forth by Peter Paret: that the study of war should examine both the 
fighting itself and also the political, social, and cultural factors that “surround and penetrate 
war,” such as the motives and action behind the battle, that hold “the key for a full 
understanding of the fighting.”4  
This thesis considers military thought to be the advanced study in the military and 
civil society that considers the nature of war itself, the character of strategy, and the process 
of military training and education which began in Europe and which, in the past half 
 
2 See the following titles for the use of “myth” and “legend” descriptors as associated with critical 
military history: Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013; Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II, The Myth of the 
Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008; Gerhard P. Gross, The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from 
Moltke the Elder to Heusinger, Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2016; and Karl-Heinz 
Freiser, The Blitzkrieg Legend, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005. 
3 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” The RUSI Journal, 138:1, https://doi-
org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1080/03071849308445676, 27.  
4 Peter Paret, Understanding War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 1. See also Michael 
Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xi for how the extraction of 
the study of war from “the environment in which it was fought—social, cultural, political, economic—was 
to ignore dimensions essential to its understanding.”   
3 
century, has developed into a global intellectual industry within which the U.S. military 
contributes an outsized role. In this enterprise one finds the intersection of war and politics, 
strategy, operations, tactics, as well as technology and battle, and the intersection and 
relevancy of military philosophy with consideration of “modern war.” Brian Linn observes 
as such in The Echo of Battle (2002) and perceives that U.S. military thought consists of a 
plethora of different considerations:  
Even before GWOT, the defense community was in the midst of a vibrant 
debate over whether the nature of war itself had changed. Advocates offered 
the prospect of a glittering future…Others defended the relevance of 
military philosophers such as Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz…The 
debate, like the defense community, overflowed with buzzwords – 
asymmetric conflict, fourth generation warfare, shock and awe, full 
spectrum dominance – many of which quickly became passe. And with 
some significant exceptions, much of this debate confined itself to 
hypothetical threats, to the relative merits of weapon systems, and to new 
tactical organizations.5     
 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
War in Europe has drawn the attention of U.S. military theorists and authors of 
doctrine that have in turn sought to interpret and extract theories and practice about the 
nature of war and how to prepare for war in its constant variety. U.S. Army officers sought 
strategic inspiration within the theorems of Jomini and the historical example of Napoleon 
in the early 19th century.6 U.S. Army officers attempted to transplant the Prussian military 
organizational model to the United States after the Civil War because they perceived it to 
be an ideal system.7 American planners charged with the defense of Europe after the 
Second World War immediately sought out the expertise of their former German enemies 
and submitted the capstone U.S. Army field manual, FM 100–5, to a select group of 
 
5 Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The American Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 1–2.  
6 Weigley, The American Way of War, 82–83 for the influence of Jomini’s military thought within 
military thought at the U.S. Military Academy in the 19th century; 87–88 for U.S. Army officer and West 
Point instructor Dennis Mahan’s interest in Napoleonic strategy and warfare as displayed in 19th century 
U.S. military thought. 
7 Weigley, 82; see also Linn, The Echo of Battle, 23. 
4 
German generals for critical review.8 The U.S. military turned to orient on land battle in 
Europe after Vietnam, adopted Clausewitz’s On War as required reading within the 
professional military education system, and solicited German review of another revision of 
FM 100–5.9 U.S. military thought has absorbed various German fighting concepts—for 
example, Auftragstaktik and Schwerpunkt—in order to generate the maneuver warfare 
doctrine and lend momentum to the use of mission-type orders within the U.S. military 
planning process.10 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, represented the synthesis of 
several strands of interpretation of European military history and purported to offer the 
general public and American political and academic elite a more intellectually credible 
response to the deteriorating security situation in post-war Iraq.11 Since September 11th, 
 
8 Smelser and Davies II, The Myth of the Eastern Front, 70.  
9 Linn, The Echo of Battle, 202–203; see also Christopher Bassford, “Clausewitz in America Today,” 
in Clausewitz Goes Global: Carl von Clausewitz in the 21st Century, edited by Reiner Pommerin, (Berlin: 
Miles-Verlag, 2011), 342–343; and Paul H. Herbert, “Deciding What Has to Be Done:  General William E. 
DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100–5, Operations,” Leavenworth Papers, no 16 (Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16040coll3/id/32/, 62. 
10 Military thinkers have considered the tactical-operational achievements of German arms during the 
First World War as worthy of consideration and perhaps emulation. The Dynamics of Doctrine: The 
Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies 
Institute, July 1981), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-
books/leavenworth-papers-4-the-dynamics-of-doctrine.pdf, examines German tactical innovation and the 
attempt to overcome the limitations of positional warfare. Bruce Gudmundsson’s Stormtroop Tactics 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1989, 2d ed released 1995) considers the same general topic, and was 
frequently referenced by my peers in the instructor cadre “bullpen” of the Marine Corps Basic School 
during 2013–2016. The Marine Corps moved to adopt “maneuver warfare” as a warfighting approach in the 
late 1980s, and looked to publications such as The Maneuver Warfare Handbook by William Lind 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985) in order to inform the publication of Fleet Marine Force 
Manual 1: Warfighting, the precursor to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting (Washington, 
DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997, 
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf). See page 3 for a direct 
cite of Clausewitz’s “wrestler” analogy, 5 for discourse on the impact of friction in war and 13–15 for notes 
on the moral-physical nature of war. These directly align to Clausewitzian discourse detailed on 119–121 
and 184 of Paret’s translation of On War. See 45–47 for discussion of the importance of the “center of 
gravity” and associated adversary “critical vulnerability,” and 78–91 for perspective on war command and 
tasking that aligns to German-influenced thought on decentralized tasking and shared understanding of 
leader intent.  
11 Gian Gentile, in Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counter-Insurgency, contends that the 
release of FM 3-24 partially represented an attempt to shape public discourse surrounding the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars towards the view that the wars could be fought successfully in a less destructive manner 
than past wars. See pages 1–12 and 24–25 for supporting details on the association of doctrine 
development, public discourse, and association of American intellectuals with FM 3-24.  
5 
2001, U.S. defense intellectuals have oriented toward information operations and warfare 
as an emerging realm of inquiry12 in light of recent Russian malign activity within Europe 
and have developed and published Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, in 
addition to multiple service-level reference publications.13 
Scholars have illuminated how such military historians as S.L.A. Marshall and 
Basil Liddell Hart approached the record of German arms in World War II in a selective 
fashion.14 These scholars have highlighted, for instance, the shortfalls of German wartime 
diplomacy, economic planning, and racialized strategic thought associated with the tactical 
and operational achievements that figured so prominently in the U.S. postwar military 
 
12War on the Rocks (https://warontherocks.com) and Foreign Affairs (https://foreignaffairs.com) 
serves as useful barometers regarding strands of emerging thought in the defense-intellectual realm. Conrad 
Crane’s “The United States Needs an Information Warfare Command: A Historical Examination” (June 14, 
2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/the-united-states-needs-an-information-warfare-command-a-
historical-examination/)  and Heidi Tworek’s “Information Warfare Is Here To Stay” (April 25, 2019, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2019-04-25/information-warfare-here-stay)  indicate the 
movement of “information”-related discourse to the more mainstream defense-intellectual public 
discussion space. The RAND Corporation maintains a web page (“Information Operations,” at 
https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html), dedicated to covering information operations 
and warfare, which include “the collection of tactical information about an adversary as well as the 
dissemination of propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent.”  Blog and 
commentary topics include Twitter insider threats, Russian designs on American domestic politics, and 
“machine learning.” 
13Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, JP 3-13 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2012), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf.  
14See Smelser and Davies II, The Myth of the Eastern Front, 2 for the core thesis that the German 
officer corps successfully transferred a racialized and reductionistic view of Wehrmacht mobile and 
defensive operations on the Eastern Front via the after-action and “lessons learned” synthesis efforts 
resident within the Halder Group, and 131–132 for specific notes on  how S.L.A. Marshall and Liddell Hart 
praised Erich von Manstein’s Lost Victories. Also, recent sources that detail the Herculean industrial, 
economic, social, political, and strategic-tactical-operational effort behind the Soviet counterattack and 
advance in 1943–1945 reveals that the Russians were the very opposite of the racialized brutes depicted in 
the postwar light by German officers. Richard Overy’s Russia’s War (New York: Penguin Books, 1997) 
depicts the social, industrial, economic, and military foundation of Russian victory on the Eastern Front. 
depicts the large-scale industrial evacuation of the Soviet industrial base (170–171), Soviet small-unit 
innovation and toughness (175–176, in Stalingrad), and the Soviet rearmament and tactical-operational-
strategic doctrine improvement effort that supported victory at Kursk (186–203, for the conditions that 
enabled victory in Kursk).  
6 
discourse.15 Other thinkers have also highlighted how a selective representation of 
European colonial war influenced the doctrinal development process associated with U.S. 
counterinsurgency planning.16 Historians have also identified the unique enabling 
circumstances, to include population displacement and control and torture, associated with 
certain episodes of European colonial warfare deemed worthy of emulation by current U.S. 
counterinsurgency doctrine, which include the French experience in Algeria, the British 
experience in Malaysia, and the British experience in the Northern Ireland “Troubles” 
during Operation BANNER.17   
As Michael Howard has said, with regard to such “disagreeable facts”18:   
It is in fact the function of the historian proper to discover and record what 
those complicated and disagreeable realities are. He has to find out, as 
Leopold von Ranke, the father of modern historiography, put it, ‘what really 
happened’. And this must inevitably involve a critical examination of the 
‘myth’, assessing and discarding its patriotic basis and probing deeply into 
the things it leaves unsaid…Inevitably the honest historian discovers, and 
must expose, things which are not compatible with the national myth; but 
to allow him to do so is necessary, not simply to confirm to the values which 
the war was fought to defend, but to preserve military efficiency for the 
future.19 
 
15 Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008,) 182–184 and 207–209 for 
the racial science foundation of the Nazi New Order, 223–224 and 256 for the dynamic of “organized 
disorder” within Nazi-occupied Europe, 261 and 286 for the authorization of self-defeating “plunder 
policies,” and 322–326 on the failure of Axis allies to overcome the “political sterility” of Nazi strategic 
thought aimed at conquest and plunder vice coalition-building and the attendant warfighting advantages 
that might have conferred.  
16 Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War, 196. The specific citation is 
related to the absorption of French counterinsurgency theorist David Galula’s prescriptions for COIN into 
FM 3-24 because the authors of 3–24 felt that “Galula told them what they wanted to hear” despite the 
“exaggerated,” if not “falsified,” nature of the French COIN claims. 
17 See Porch, 181–182, 175–178 for notes on torture and coercive COIN tactics during the French 
campaign in Algeria; 255 for how British COIN tactics included “population resettlement” and the 
movement of ethnic Chinese to “rural ghettoes, and 276–277 for how British authorities applied a “rerun of 
failed tactics” to the Northern Ireland conflict. 
18 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” 27. 
19 Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” 27. Gian Gentile also cites this article in Wrong 
Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counter-Insurgency, 141. 
7 
Historical analogy lends credibility towards any dialogue the considers how to 
fight.20 However, Hannibal encircled and annihilated the Romans at Cannae only once.21 
The German military historian Hans Delbrück devoted his life and intellectual energy 
towards “clearing away the underbrush of legend” and educating both military 
professionals and the general public about military myths, legends, and the linkages 
between ways of battle and the inner workings and politics of societies throughout 
history.22 Military planners who approach the past in a selective and biased manner risk 
leveraging military myth against problems that defy reduction to the status of direct 
historical analogy. For example, Strachan contends that German military planners pursued 
the “Cannae” battle ideal to futility during the First World War.23 The aim of this project 
is to illuminate the past and present ties between U.S. military thought as expressed in 
doctrine and the imagined and historical reality of war in Europe in order to explore how 
the use and abuse of military history has shaped the genesis of U.S. military doctrine and, 
perhaps, why it has and will continue to vex U.S. efforts to make war, win war, and sustain 
peace. 
 
20 U.S. Marine Corps Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1–3, Tactics (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997) https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCDP%201-
3%20Tactics.pdf,  cites a number of historical battles and aligns them against tactical principles. See 16–19 
for discussion on how the Battle of Anzio in 1944 illustrates the pitfalls of tactical indecisiveness, 27–29 on 
how Union cavalry action during the Battle of Gettysburg exemplifies decisiveness, 50–52 for how 
Operation “Dewey Canyon” as carried out in Vietnam in 1969 supported the goal of “trapping the enemy,” 
104–105 on how General Grant’s pursuit of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia enabled the Union to “exploit 
and finish” the enemy, and 107–108 on how U.S. Marine leaders employed their reserve to win the Battle 
of Tarawa in 1943. 
21 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1–3, Tactics, identifies the Battle of Cannae, fought in 216 BC, 
as an example of “a clear tactical decision achieved.”  The addendum is that tactical engagements should 
achieve operational and strategic goals. See 20–24 for perspective on the Battle of Cannae.  
22 Gordon A. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 326 for how 
Delbrück applied his own historical method aimed at sorting out truth and history from legend to the 
military record of the past; 327 for how he served as a vocal critic of the military thinking and strategic 
approach within the First World War German state; 336–337 for how Delbrück reconstructed the history of 
ancient battles such as Marathon and Cannae in order to understand what really happened there.  
23Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, (London: Routledge, 2004), 130–132 for 
Strachan’s thesis that Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen failed to distinguish between the tactical 
implications and requirements of fighting and winning a battle of annihilation and the operational-strategic 
implications, for instance, of violating Belgian neutrality. 
8 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Military thinkers have thought about how to fight and have translated their thoughts 
into various principles aligned with the “Principles of War” theme since the 18th century 
if not earlier, and European military thought influenced and inspired U.S. military 
thought.24 The record of how U.S. military thinkers since the 19th century have considered 
the intellectual legacy of Carl von Clausewitz and his work On War or not, for instance, 
indicates that appreciation of On War falls into two discernable intellectual veins: a 
generally reductionistic-extractive approach and a mode of inquiry grounded in 
historicism and contextual analysis of both the text of On War and the circumstances 
unique to Clausewitz’s time. 
The reductionistic-extractive approach identifies Clausewitz as the “Madhi of 
Mass”.25  This approach contends that Clausewitzian thought orients primarily on the 
annihilation of enemy combat formations, improperly and rigidly focuses on destroying a 
single “center of gravity” via decisive battle, and neglects the importance of altering 
adversary decision-making processes.26 The reductionistic-extractive approach also 
contends that the emergence of such “non state actor”-driven conflict as guerilla war 
 
24 Alger, The Quest for Victory, 178–184 for the transmission and perpetuation of the listing of 
“principles of war” and their integration into military instruction, education, and thought.   
25 Christopher Bassford, “John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: a Polemic,” 
War in History 1, no. 3 (November 1994), 319, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://www-jstor-
org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/26004375.  
26 The doctrine of John Boyd serves as the cornerstone of the U.S. Marine Corps “maneuver warfare” 
doctrine detailed within Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting. Ian Brown provides a 
comprehensive transcript of Boyd’s famous “Patterns of Conflict” brief as delivered to Marines in the late 
1980s in A New Conception of War:  John Boyd, the U. S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare (Quantico: 
Marine Corps University Press, 2018,) 209–213, and 212 for Slide #41, which delivers the critique on 
Clausewitz. Robert Coram, Boyd’s biographer, details Boyd’s generally dismissive attitude towards 
Clausewitz in favor of Sun Tzu in Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York: Back 
Bay Books,) 330–334. Grant T. Hammond corroborates the thesis that Boyd reduced Clausewitzian thought 
to an attrition mindset with The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington: Smithsonian 
Books, 2001,) 129–130.  
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renders the “Clausewitzian Universe” increasingly irrelevant.27  Clausewitzian reasoning 
and strategy should “disappear”28 as “terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and robbers…motivated 
by fanatical, ideologically-based loyalties” wage the “low intensity conflict” that 
Clausewitzian analysis is ill-equipped to appreciate.29 
The approach that incorporates historicism and contextual analysis of 
Clausewitzian thought considers the intellectual, cultural, and historical context within 
which Clausewitz lived, studied, and wrote. This approach considers the impact of the 
emergence of the recognizably modern nation-state, the changing character of battlefield 
combat, and the influence that such belief systems as Pietism had on Clausewitz and his 
intellectual development.30 This perspective also considers how such Prussian reformers 
as Scharnhorst influenced Clausewitz, and also how Clausewitz himself thought about the 
linkages between military theory and the reality of war.31 Historians more aligned with 
this approach contend that much of modern scholarship reduces Clausewitzian thought to 
bromides shaped to fit the needs of military managerial science and those seeking to 
 
27 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 40, 41, 49; 58 
for Van Creveld’s comment on the “Clausewitzian Universe.”  I include Van Creveld due to the fact that 
his ideas have garnered attention within corners of the U.S. defense intellectual establishment; The 
Transformation of War features a positive review from Colonel Michael Wyly, USMC, who at time of 
publishing was Vice President of the Marine Corps University and a key proponent of the Marine Corps 
“maneuver warfare” doctrine.  
28 Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 225. 
29 Van Creveld, 197 for Van Creveld’s list of belligerents and 20–21 for his description of the low 
intensity conflict (LIC). 
30 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3rd edition 2007), 3–5 
for Paret’s approach towards the political climate of Clausewitz’s time; 32 for how the changing character 
of 19th century warfare, to include the mass mobilization behind the revolutionary French armies, 
influenced Clausewitz; 34–35 on how Clausewitz’s participation in combat in the French revolutionary 
wars of 1793–1794 influenced him; 36–37 for details on how “A bourgeoisie that was growing ambitious 
and self-assertive demanded training for its sons that was secular and realistic, and that would breach some 
of the restrictive, aristocratic walls encapsulating German society. Pietism, with its rejection of external, 
formal standards of thought and conduct for the sake of achieving a rich inner development, was one major 
source of the new education.” 
31 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 71 for notes on how Scharnhorst, the Prussian reformer, 351 for 
Clausewitz’s approach towards other thinkers he considered too doctrinaire and prescriptive; 371 for 
Clausewitz’s thoughts on the integration of consideration of emotional forces into theory and the 
unattainability of a “positive” military doctrine that can truly “lay down valid rules for the conduct of war.” 
. 
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“exonerate” armed forces from the stigma of failure, to the detriment of consideration of 
the forces of “anger, hatred, and primordial violence,” which also appear in On War.32  
U.S. military thought has historically applauded the German tactical and 
operational record. Historians have appreciated the story of the First World War-era 
evolution and adaptation of German small-unit squad level tactics.33 Historical 
commentary also isolates examples of praiseworthy small-unit German tactical success, 
such as the seizure of the Belgian Eban Emael fortress in 1940 and the rescue of Benito 
Mussolini in 1943, to inform and gird theories of special operations warfare.34 
Additionally, such German concepts as Auftragstaktik and Schwerpunkt—respectively 
denoting decentralized orders within a command climate centered on trust and the focus of 
main military effort—informed the Marine Corps “maneuver warfare renaissance” by way 
 
32 Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, Soldiers, War, Knowledge, and Citizenship: German-
American Essays on Civil Military Relations (Norderstedt, Germany: Miles Verlag, 2017), 211–212 for 
commentary on the lack of emphasis on primordial violence and anger detailed in On War (Book I, Ch. 1, 
Part 28, p. 89). Also, 213–215 in Soldiers, War, Knowledge, and Citizenship for commentary on the 
relevance of the historical context of On War to today, and 221 for commentary on the focus of much of 
Clausewitz scholarship on the “first trinity” of the people, government, and military to the exclusion of the 
role that “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity” play in war.  
33 Gudmundsson,  Stormtroop Tactics, 171–173 on the decentralization of firepower and maneuver 
capabilities towards the German squad and devolution of command responsibility to lieutenants and 
noncommissioned officers; 176 on the integration of pioneer/combat engineer type formations into German 
tactical innovation efforts; 177 on the failure of German “operational art” and the consequent forcing 
function on the development of “stormtroop tactics” as the solution to stalemate. Stormtroop Tactics was 
sold physically at The Marine Shop, the merchandise shop associated with the Marine Corps Association, 
when I was stationed in Quantico in 2013–2016. 
34 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, (New York: Presidio 
Press, 1995,) 8 for the establishment of the “six principles of special operations” against which various 
small-unit actions are evaluated, to include Operation “Oak,” the glider-borne German mission to rescue 
Benito Mussolini from captivity in 1943; 60–69 for analysis on the German seizure of Eban Emael in 1940; 
188 for McRaven’s assessment of Operation “Oak.”  
11 
of historical synthesis and analysis aimed at promoting U.S. excellence within the tactical 
and operational levels of war.35  
U.S. military thought also praised the historical record of the German General Staff 
and posited that the organization possessed a “genius for war” and that the “more effective 
military institutions” represented within the German armed forces generated “combat 
superiority”.36 U.S. military planners looked to the combat record of the Wehrmacht as 
demonstrated on the Eastern Front in order to frame thought on land war against the Soviet 
Union solicited the thoughts of German officers, who willingly expounded on the 
importance of the “mobile defense”.37 German general officers also provided their input 
directly to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command during the drafting process of 
Field Manual 100–5 during 1974–1975.38 
Critical historical analysis lends context to the discourse surrounding the U.S. 
perception of German fighting skill. Recent scholarship, for example, contends that high-
profile missions celebrated for their tactical proficiency and strategic relevance by U.S. 
 
35 Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 9 for the thesis that German First World War tactical assault 
team tactics were “maneuver type tactics”; 14 and the association of “mission type orders” and command 
decentralization with the German army; 18 for a digression on the importance of the schwerpunckt and 
corresponding focus of military effort in war; 43 citation of General Erwin Rommel’s Infantry Attacks as a 
positive example of a work that identifies the thought processes of a successful German commander in the 
First World War; 42 for a positive view on how the Second World War Wehrmacht taught their lieutenants 
to think “two levels up” in order to understand how their unit mission fit within the overall task pursued by 
their higher command echelon. The context of these citations is excellence on the immediate battlefield; the 
Maneuver Warfare Handbook omits mention of any strategic-diplomatic trends that contributed to German 
defeat. 
36 T. N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945, (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 300 for the association of “combat superiority” in terms of how many 
casualties the Germans inflicted on their opponents, superior performance of junior officers and soldiers, 
and better “imagination and bolder initiative.” 
37 Smelser and Davies II, The Myth of the Eastern Front, 64–66 for the formation of the Halder Group 
under the supervision of the German general Franz Halder; 67–69 for the inclusion of accused war 
criminals within the group and their production of a number of historical studies on the German experience 
in the Eastern Front; and 70 for how the U.S. Army provided a copy of the capstone Army doctrinal 
manual, FM 100–5, to Halder and his generals in 1952 for their critiques. Department of the Army 
Pamphlet (DA PAM) No. 20–269, “Small Unit Actions during the German Campaign in Russia,” July 
1953, https://history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-22-1/index.html,  is a good example of how this group 
provided American military planners a German-influenced perspective on fighting Russians.  
38 Herbert, “Deciding What Has to Be Done,” 62–66. 
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researchers actually served a primarily propagandistic mission within Nazi Germany.39 
Critical scholarship also contends that German officers mounted an effort to recast the 
German armed forces as a mythical “Clean Wehrmacht” and have identified the racialized 
quality of the German “lessons learned” compendium as published by the Halder Group.40  
Historians have also argued that German military thought oriented excessively on 
tactical and operational achievement, to the detriment of logistical and economic 
considerations in the epoch of total war, the actual moral consequences of support to 
Hitler’s policies, and the unsurmountable limitations associated with waging war in the 
interior of Central Europe against two foes dismissed for ideological reasons as inferior.41  
Scholars also argue that German planners experienced a “loss of reality,”42 misapplied the 
lessons of the rapid campaigns in Scandinavia and the Low Countries, assumed the 
 
39 Andreas Alexander Handschuh, “Otto Skorzeny and the read conduct of Unternehmen Eiche and 
Unternehmen Panzerfaust,” NPS Master’s Thesis, 2017, at http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56935; see 2–4 for 
details on discrepancies between fact and fiction, 6 for the absence of critical scholarship regarding the 
missions, 35–40 and 47–48 for how Nazi mythmaking and propagandization of the missions served 
strategic propagandistic purposes and German wartime recruitment efforts during a time of general 
strategic reversal, and also how postwar mythmaking was congruent with a public discourse that sought to 
disassociate the German soldier from Nazi crimes. The author relied on German-language sources to a far 
greater extent than McRaven’s Spec Ops:  
40 Smelser and Davies II, The Myth of the Eastern Front, 248–249 on the core thesis that the “clean 
Wehrmacht” myth emerged from the concerted effort of German officers to recast the record of the German 
armed forces, cultural transfer between German officers and American officers, and the willingness of 
American diplomats and military officers to overlook German crimes in the interest of learning how to 
fight the Russians; 68–69 for an account of the Halder Group. Smelser and Davies cite Heinz Guderian’s 
Panzer Leader (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002) as a high-profile example of a work that 
contributes to the “clean Wehrmacht” discourse and disassociates senior German army leaders from Nazi 
genocide. See Panzer Leader, 446, for Guderian’s disavowal of any knowledge of the Nazi death camp 
system and “Final Solution.”  Also, see DA PAM 20-269, “Small Unit Actions during the German 
Campaign in Russia,” 2 for the following account of the “Slav psyche”: “The Slav psyche especially where 
it is under more or less pronounced Asiatic influences covers a wide range in which fanatic conviction, 
extreme bravery, and cruelty bordering on bestiality are coupled with childlike kindliness and susceptibility 
to sudden fear and terror… when he was dealt a severe, well-timed blow, a mass reaction of fear and terror 
would throw him and his comrades completely off balance.”     
41 Gross, The Myth and Reality of German Warfare, 192 on the absence of a coherent “Blitzkrieg” 
strategy in Poland and France during 1939–1940; 205 on Hitler’s lebensraum policy as tied to the war 
effort; 209 on the economic limitations Germany began the war with; 214 on German staff assumptions 
about how Blitzkrieg-type doctrine would be successful in Russia due to validation in France; and 215–216 
and 246 on German inattention to logistical considerations in the Soviet Union and how German logistics 
were oriented on a short campaign that included forage as a procurement option.  
42 Gross, 257. 
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“Blitzkrieg Legend” would hold in France, and were “operationally winning to death” in 
on the Eastern Front.43  In other words, grand tactics and operations cannot, in the end, 
supplant grand strategy and circumvent concrete material restraints. 
 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis incorporates aspects of the method employed by Peter Paret in 
Clausewitz and the State (1976), the leading biography of the Prussian theorist of war, 
which also explains how to best make sense of Clausewitzian theory. Specifically, Paret 
weaves political, intellectual, historical, and psychological context together throughout his 
appreciation of Clausewitz’s life and thoughts on war and the nature of the state.44 The 
present research design initially considers past and current discourse about Clausewitz and 
his work within the military history and defense intellectual realms. The research design 
then transitions to assesses whether the same intellectual divergence observable within U.S. 
consideration of Clausewitz and On War applies to the generation of U.S. military doctrine 
after the Second World War. The thesis considers how American military planners studied 
and absorbed German tactical-operational “lessons learned” during both the 1950s Halder 
Group activities and 1970s–1980s production of the various iterations of FM 100–5. The 
analysis of the story of the adoption of  Clausewitz and On War within U.S. military 
thought generates the analytical framework required to consider the impact of European 
war on U.S. military thought as it unfolded within the relationship between the U.S. 
military and the historical record of German arms in total war in Europe. 
 
43 Karl-Heinz Freiser, The Blitzkrieg Legend, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 351.  
44 Paret, Clausewitz and the State; see 32 for notes on how the French Revolution brought new 
strategic and tactical considerations to the European battlefield; 34–35 on Paret’s consideration of how a 
youthful Clausewitz responded to mobilization and war psychologically; 37 and 45 for the emergence of 
mass movements such as Pietism and the interest in modernization within Prussian society; 45–46 on the 
intellectual climate within Prussia and also within Clausewitz’s regiment; 71–77 for the impact that the 
Prussian reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst had on Clausewitz in addition to Paret’s consideration of the 
psychological forces at work after the death of Clausewitz’s father; 119 for Clausewitz’s response to de 
Jomini’s military thought as published during his time; 366 for perspective on dialectical relationships 
within On War; 373 and the importance Clausewitz attached to emotional and non-rational forces when 
considering war; 374 on Clausewitz’s integration of psychological consideration of personality types into 
his own writing; and 438–440 for additional material on Clausewitz’s conception of the “state” and the 
impact it had on his own work. 
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The thesis will incorporate the following sources and materials:  the doctrinal 
publications themselves, secondary historical sources utilized to inform the drafting 
process, and sources such as professional military journals that reflect U.S. military 
discourse revolving around primary and secondary European military history sources.   
 THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of four chapters. The second chapter considers the inclusion of 
On War within U.S. military thought and how American appreciation of Clausewitz and 
On War has diverged into two intellectual approaches. The first approach constructs a de 
facto Clausewitz myth and treats On War as a “how to fight manual.” The second approach 
employs the analytical framework employed by Peter Paret within Clausewitz and the State 
and expounds on the nature of the work as meditation on the interplay between themes not 
typically considered within the defense-intellectual scholarship field in order to delineate 
between the history that informs consideration of Clausewitz, and the myths associated 
with consideration of his work. 
The third chapter focuses on U.S. appreciation of German fighting prowess after 
the Second World War. This chapter also considers histories such as Gross’s The Myth and 
Reality of German Warfare critical of the performance of the German Wehrmacht and 
General Staff during the Second World War. This chapter illuminates the pitfalls of an 
unqualified appreciation of German tactical-operational achievements in the Second World 
War in light of critical history highlighting German operational-strategic planning 
deficiencies, Germany’s racialized policy towards conquered territories, and German 
postwar mythmaking. The third chapter then considers integration of the German fighting 
approach into U.S. military thought as published within U.S. armed service trade journals, 
capstone U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army doctrinal publications, and the broader realm 
of academic inquiry into the history of German arms in modern Europe.45 
 
 
45 Battle Leadership, for instance, is viewable for purchase at The Marine Shop, affiliated with the 
Marine Corps Association, at https://www.marineshop.net/battle-leadership-pb-0940328410. Likewise, 
Storm of Steel is available at https://www.marineshop.net/storm-of-steel-pb-0142437905.  
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II. WHAT IS WAR, WHO IS CLAUSEWITZ, AND WHY DID HE 
JOIN THE U.S. ARMY? 
The search for the influence of ideas in military institutions is fraught with peril, 
since the evidence is often ephemeral or misleading. Since the 18th century, European 
military thought has often operated in profound ways in the U.S. military. Seen from the 
perspective of the year 2021, then, the case of Carl von Clausewitz, the great Prussian 
theorist of war, is no exception. In this question of Clausewitz and his influence, two 
approaches of method and thought can be said to operate in the U.S. with regard to the 
Prussian and his thought: the reductionistic-extractive approach and the historic-contextual 
approach. The figures of the reductionistic-extractive approach have often wrongly and 
tendentiously isolated and transplanted a small number of key terms and phrases from On 
War into U.S. doctrine, military educational curricula, and the analysis of past U.S. military 
failure in since the Vietnam War.46 These persons also assert that Clausewitz oriented 
excessively on linear battle as fought in the classical period of the wars of the cabinets in 
the 18th century to the Napoleonic age and, despite his death in 1831 from cholera, 
generated the intellectual climate responsible for ill effects of total war as manifest in 
twentieth century  warfare in the years 1914–1945.47 This school also erroneously 
maintains that such phenomena as guerilla war, terrorism, and the so called progressive 
decay of the  “Westphalian” state-centric political institutions renders the Clausewitzian 
“state-centric analytical model” irrelevant.48 
The historic-contextual approach taken in the world of German letters, in turn, 
considers the intellectual, cultural, psychological, and political context within which such 
figures as Clausewitz lived, studied, and wrote. Most importantly, such scholars analyze 
 
46 See Summers, On Strategy, 5–6 for the integration of aspects of the Clausewitzian trinity into 
analysis of U.S. failure in Vietnam. 
47 J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961), 60. See also, 
regarding Basil Liddell Hart’s polemical comment that Clausewitz was the “Madhi of Mass” within John 
Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196), 181.  
48 Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 41. 
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how Clausewitz and others of his time fought in and interpreted the levels of war. Peter 
Paret’s Clausewitz and the State (1976 and 2007) diverges from the critical-reductionistic-
extractive approach. Paret broadly examines how Clausewitz perceived war in the context 
of the rise of Napoleon within absolutist Europe as well as within the intellectual climate 
shaped by the 18th century German classicism of Goethe, Schiller, and Beethoven.  
The historic-contextual approach expands consideration of On War beyond a 
handful of catch phrases and buzzwords. This school shows how Clausewitz thought and 
acted on a number of themes not commonly referenced within the broader literature: the 
utility of military theory to understand war; the dynamic effect of uncertainty and 
psychological forces within relationship between government, military forces, and the 
people; and the importance of military genius as fusion between intellect and moral and 
physical courage. Military thought in the Anglo Saxon world since 1918 that either 
selectively extracts passages or condemns the Prussian as the “Madhi of Mass” affords 
little consideration to the age of European revolution in the years 1780–1850, German 
classicism, and biography grounded in the 18th and 19th centuries—a time that has become 
too remote in the minds of too many interested in the character of war and military thought.  
 THE LIFE OF CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ AND THE COMPOSITION OF 
ON WAR 
1. Clausewitz and the French Revolutionary Wars 
Carl von Clausewitz was born in 1780 in Prussia. His father was a retired Prussian 
army lieutenant, and his family claimed noble lineage that was eventually formally 
recognized within the Prussian royal court in 1827.49 The young Clausewitz saw combat 
in the Prussian army for the first time in 1793 during the defensive campaign against the 
initial wave of French revolutionary violence in the Rhineland.50 It was here that 
Clausewitz encountered the physical manifestation of the transformation of the nature of 
warfare wrought by the French revolutionary politics that exploited and mobilized societal 
 
49 Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited 
by Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 188. 
50  Paret, 188. 
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energies towards conquest and destruction.51 Paret surveys the wide-ranging 
transformation in warfare that occurred during the initial wars of the French revolution and 
subsequent Napoleonic campaigns, all of which Clausewitz was associated with as either 
direct combatant or staff officer. Clausewitz would come to appreciate the arrival of a new 
form of warfare, marked by political and psychological mobilization of mass armies and 
accompanied by new battlefield tactics.52  Clausewitz would also come to perceive a clear 
connection between political activity within a given community and the activity of warfare: 
“by revolutionizing society, the state was able as never before to exploit the energies of 
society for war.”53 
The army demobilized in 1795, and Clausewitz returned to Prussia after gaining 
battle experience during raids, small-unit detachment action, and ambushes.54 He remained 
in garrison until 1801 and then departed to Berlin in order to attend a three year long 
military school overseen by Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who had served within the 
Hanoverian army during the French revolutionary wars and who had then accepted an offer 
to join Prussian service in 1801.55 Scharnhorst exercised tremendous influence on 
Clausewitz in Berlin, and indeed throughout Clausewitz’s life, and inspired Clausewitz’s 
later thoughts on the characteristics of military genius, his skeptical attitude towards the 
 
51 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 26 for notes on the shifting ground battle tactics of the French 
revolutionary armies and 32–33 for notes on the mobilization effect of the psychological forces resident 
within the French revolution on the French revolutionary armies. 
52  Paret, 26–27 for notes on tactical innovation within the French revolutionary armies and 32–33 for 
notes on how Clausewitz perceived the behavior of the new revolutionary French state and the impact it 
had on war. 
53 Paret, 32. See also 30 on how Clausewitz appreciated the arrival of “expendable mass armies” in 
the later 1790s and the impact this arrival had on the nature of what had previously been more limited 
warfare during 1792–1793. 
54 Paret, “Clausewitz,” 188. 
55 Paret, 189. 
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“pretentious theories” resident within European military thought, and the importance of 
grounding military theory in sound understanding of military history.56  
Clausewitz graduated at the top of his class in 1804, was assigned as the adjutant 
to Prince August, and in 1805 published his first professional military article that critiqued 
the strategic theory of Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow, who at the time was a prominent 
German military theorist.57 Clausewitz believed that Bülow’s scholarship, which defined 
strategy as “all military movements out of the enemy’s cannon range or range of vision,” 
and tactics as “all movement within this range”58 was inadequate and inherently flawed. 
Bülow, Clausewitz charged, had constructed an argument that was problematic for several 
reasons: the argument was too closely connected to the pace of technological change and 
inclined to shift as weapon ranges and capabilities shifts; analysis was too closely linked 
to geography and weapon math and did not consider the physical and psychological effects 
of fighting; and, finally, did not consider the full range of factors related to war such as 
soldier morale and commander psychology.59 Clausewitz, instead, defined strategy and 
tactics as theories applicable to all past, present, and future war: “Tactics constitute the 
theory of the use of armed forces in battle; strategy forms the theory of using battle for the 
purposes of the war.”60 Paret observes that Clausewitz was drawn to considering the 
“timeless phenomena” of war via application of observable reality and hypothesis.61 
 
56 See Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 71–76 for how Scharnhorst influenced Clausewitz; 71 for how 
Scharnhorst’s “conviction that the study of history must lie at the center of any advanced study of war,”; 71 
for Scharnhorst’s skepticism regarding Jomini and other theorists of the time; and particularly 74–76 for 
how Scharnhorst served as a second father figure – “the father and friend of my spirit” – to Clausewitz after 
the death of Clausewitz’s father in 1802 and first wife in 1803.  
57 Paret, “Clausewitz,” 189–190. 
58 Paret, 190. 
59 Paret, 190–191. 
60 Paret, 190. 
61 Paret, 191. 
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2. 1806: Clausewitz’s Return to the Battlefield and the Defeat of Prussia 
Clausewitz returned to the battlefield in 1806 as Prussia entered the war against 
Napoleon. Clausewitz and Prince August led a Prussian grenadier battalion at the Battle of 
Auerstädt, north of Jena.62 The French captured Clausewitz and the prince as the Prussians 
withdrew from the battlefield and exhausted their ammunition during a rearguard battle.63 
Clausewitz spent the next year in Paris as a prisoner and returned to Prussia in late 1807. 
He then travelled to Königsberg, the temporary home of the Prussian government, in 1808 
and swiftly joined Scharnhorst and the circle of reformers that sought to modernize 
Prussian military institutions and solve the problems that had generated defeat at Jena and 
Auerstadt.64 Specifically, Scharnhorst and Clausewitz supported ending the noble 
monopoly on officer commissions, reforming the rigid Prussian disciplinary and drill 
system, and encouraging initiative amongst all ranks in the Prussian military.65 Clausewitz 
served as personal assistant to Scharnhorst, and then accompanied him and the rest of the 
Prussian government during the return to Berlin after the end of the French occupation. 
Scharnhorst appointed Clausewitz to the Prussian general staff and faculty at the new 
Prussian kriegschule, and Clausewitz also became the military tutor to the Prussian crown 
prince in 1810.66 
Clausewitz continued to write and think about war at this time, and pondered how 
theory could make sense of war.67 The great current of German philosophy at this time, 
German idealism and romanticism, manifested as aesthetic resistance within art, literature, 
and music to certain features of  the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason that had 
previously emerged in Western Europe that led to too great a role of the natural sciences 
in human affairs and forms of theory and universalism that went against the legacy of the 
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particular.68 German romanticism centered around such figures  as Johann Goethe and 
Friedrich Schiller and embraced contemplation of what was infinite, mystical, and rooted 
in an earlier time.69 Romanticism held that the poet was best positioned, as a genius, to 
navigate and reveal the nature of the hidden and irrational world to the general public 
audience.70 Paret observes that Clausewitz did not engage with the Romantic perspective 
that embraced the mystical and antique, and instead internalized the precepts of the anti-
rationalist Sturm und Drang (Storm and Stress) movement that embraced “unity of all 
phenomena,” and encouraged attainment of “internal and external harmony” and the 
“disciplined mastery of thought and form”.71  
Paret also observes that Clausewitz adopted many of the patterns of thought and 
argumentation, to include the use of the dialectic and ideal types taken from philosophy, 
prevalent at the time and would incorporate these patterns, later, into On War: “thesis and 
antithesis, contradiction, polarity, the separation and connection between the active and 
passive, and positive and negative.”72 Clausewitz departed from the precepts of the 
Romantic movement as he sought to apply the aforementioned ideas to the actual physical, 
intellectual, and psychological aspects of political activity and war.73 Simply put, 
Clausewitz sought to extend a generalized philosophical approach well present among the 
educated of his day on hand in the nobility and the bourgeoisie  that had emerged within 
the world of the mind to the reality that he had lived ever since he was a cadet of twelve 
and in combat against the French revolutionary armies in the Rhine Valley and the Vosges 
above it. 
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3. Clausewitz in Russian Service, 1811–1815 
France defeated Austria at Wagram in 1809 after a brief war and, in 1811, 
subsequently compelled Prussia to open borders and territory for French forces staging for 
the attack into Russia.74 Clausewitz strongly opposed this and, along with about thirty 
other officers, resigned his Prussian commission in protest and travelled to Russia.75 
Clausewitz gained appointment as a colonel in the Tsar’s army and accompanied Russian 
forces throughout 1812 and 1813. He attempted to return to service in the Prussian military 
in 1813.76 The Prussian king denied this request, and Clausewitz remained formally in 
Russian uniform and informally assigned to Scharnhorst, who died after the Battle of 
Lützen from wounds sustained in combat.77 Clausewitz served as the chief of staff for a 
small multinational force that cleared the French army away from the Baltic coast, and 
eventually reentered Prussian service during the “Hundred Days” marked by the return of 
Napoleon in 1815.78 Clausewitz served as chief of staff of the third Prussian corps that 
blocked and delayed French reinforcements from assisting the main body of Napoleon’s 
troops.79 Paret observes that, while he was blocked from more visible and prestigious 
assignments due to his resignation and reformist impulses, “few officers his age could look 
back on experiences as varied as his, ranging from combat and staff duties to strategic 
planning and participation in politico-military decisions of the highest significance.”80 
4. The Return to Prussian Service and On War 
Clausewitz served as the chief of staff of Prussian Rhineland forces for several 
years, resumed his study of military history and theory in 1816, and proceeded to assume 
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leadership of the Berlin Prussian war college in 1818. He began writing On War in 1819 
and completed the first six chapters and drafts of the final two planned chapters by 1827. 
Clausewitz stopped writing On War in 1827 when he concluded that he had not properly 
explained and incorporated two key thoughts about war that he had been pondering for 
some time, and therefore needed to revise the On War manuscript which he believed to be 
“as a rather formless mass that must be thoroughly reworked once more.”81 Specifically, 
Clausewitz wrote the following regarding the need for revision: 
War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow 
the enemy – to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus 
forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of 
his frontier districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining 
at the peace negotiations. Transitions from one type to the other will of 
course recur in my treatment; but the fact that the aims of the two types are 
quite different must be clear at all times, and their points of irreconcilability 
brought out. 
This distinction between the two kinds of war is an actual fact. But no less 
practical is the importance of another point that must be made absolutely 
clear, namely that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other 
means. If this is firmly kept in mind throughout, it will greatly facilitate the 
study of the subject and the whole will be easier to analyze.82 
Clausewitz wrote histories of several Napoleonic campaigns before beginning the 
changes in order to better understand how to work his ideas about the dual forms of war 
and the connection between war and politics and was only able to revise a few chapters 
before being detailed to the Prussian artillery inspectorate in 1830.83 Prussia then 
mobilized in order to prepare to meet the prospect of French revolutionary violence, and 
Clausewitz assumed the post of chief of staff of the mobilized Prussian army.84 He died in 
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1831 from the cholera epidemic which began in Russia and then spread to Poland and 
Western Europe.85  
On War remains his most widely known composition, and Paret’s 1979 translation 
—or excerpts thereof—features, ubiquitously, in perhaps every professional military 
educational program syllabus and reading list encountered by U.S. military officers. On 
War consists of eight books. Book I, “On the Nature of War,” defines war in social and 
political context, identifies elements such as danger and friction that are always present in 
war, and also identifies how the demands of war call for the exercise of “military genius”.86 
Clausewitz considers the psychological nature of military genius in order to best identify 
those traits of character and intellect best suited to overcome the friction present in war. As 
Paret observes, 
Originality and creativity raised to the highest power—which is how the 
late Enlightenment and idealist philosophy defined genius—were thus used 
by Clausewitz to identify and interpret general intellectual and 
psychological qualities, just as they represented and helped explain the 
freedom of will and action that was potentially present in each human 
being.87 
Paret also observes that Clausewitz introduces, in Book I, the two dialectical 
relationships involving war that endure throughout the entire book and which make for 
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problems among a readership today that cannot understand this method of thought as 
applied to military affairs and the nature of war. The first dialectical relationship is the 
relationship and interplay between the concepts of the theoretical ideal of war—“absolute 
war”—that, in an abstract sense as present in a plan on paper, involves the total destruction 
of the enemy, and war as it actually occurs in the real world.88 The divergence between 
absolute war, i.e., as an ideal type in theory and real war as it actually exists in all its 
confusion and contradictions of chance, purpose, anger, violence and hatred enables 
Clausewitz to explore the characteristics of organized violence as it occurs in the real 
world, and enables him to isolate, among other factors, the political nature of war and the 
influence that politics exercise on the conduct of war.89 The second dialectical relationship 
introduced in Book I that extends throughout On War is captured in the argument that real 
war consists of three elements, a “remarkable trinity” comprised of “violence and passion; 
uncertainty, chance, and probability; and political purpose and effect.”90 Clausewitz 
proceeds to associate the “people” with violence and passion, the “commander and his 
army” with chance and probability, and “government” with political purpose and effect.91 
Book II, “On the Theory of War,” explores the limitations and purpose of military 
theory in the frame of the 17th through the 19th century and also delves into historical 
methods and the utility of military history of a very specific type that also is not easily 
comprehended in contemporary staff schools and doctrine mechanisms.92 Book III, “On 
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Strategy in General,” includes chapters on force, time, and space, and also on the more 
indefinable, yet crucial, “moral elements” present on the battlefield that defy easy 
description and “have to be seen or felt,” such as the “spirit or other moral qualities of an 
army, a general, or a government, the temper of a population in a theater of war…” and 
“the moral effects of victory or defeat.”93  
Book IV, “The Engagement,” deals with “the essential military activity, fighting, 
by which its material and psychological effects comprises in simple or compound form the 
overall object of the war.”94 Book IV examines various physical and psychological aspects 
of fighting, the conditions that contribute to decision on the battlefield, and the role that 
large-scale engagements occupy within a successful campaign.95 Paret identifies Books V, 
VI, and VII—“Military Forces,” “Defense,” and “The Attack,” respectively—as the most 
“conventionally military” chapters that build upon previously introduced arguments.96 
Book VIII, “War Plans,” is the final book and considers the relationship between 
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theoretical “absolute” war and war as it truly occurs, as well as the political nature of war 
and how politics and strategy interact with each other.97 Clausewitz advises the reader that 
the French revolutionary wars and Napoleonic campaigns generated conditions aligned to 
“absolute war”,98 and that the political object of war ought to be understood before the 
beginning of any war:  
No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without 
first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how 
he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter is its 
operational objective.99  
Clausewitz also considers the variety of military history, from antiquity to his 
immediate past in the 1820s, and identifies how changing political arrangements and 
leadership behaviors, popular sentiment and passions, and variations of military formation 
and fighting tactics shaped the outward manifestation of the phenomenon of war.100 
Clausewitz observes how, for instance, the “wars of the cabinets,” that is, war more or less 
in its form from 1648 until 1792 or so, waged by political leaders such as Frederick the 
Great effectively isolated those estates in society from the waging of war and the battlefield 
because of dynastic interests and the assumption that certain social groups have no military 
value at all.101  However, Clausewitz observes, the French revolutionary wars reintroduced 
the popular will and passion of the people across the breadth of society and brought war 
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close to its “absolute” state as could be.102 Chapter Four, “Closer Definition of the Military 
Objective: The Defeat of the Enemy” of Book VIII briefly introduces the concept of the 
“center of gravity” as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything 
depends.”103 The center of gravity, per Clausewitz, might be many things: an army, or an 
enemy capital, or perhaps the “community of interest” within an alliance, or even “the 
personalities of the leaders and their public opinion” within the context of a popular 
uprising.104  
Book VIII concludes with a series of chapters that consider how to best apply 
military force in order to accomplish political objectives ranging from the total defeat of 
the enemy and his army in the mode of the Napoleonic offensive to more limited offensive 
and defensive operations.105 Clausewitz observes that  Clausewitz advises the reader that 
governments that request “purely military advice”106 of their commanders do so foolishly, 
because  
No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of 
political factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful 
political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying 
what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its 
influence.107 
With this analysis of the essential elements in Clausewitz’s biography, one must 
turn to the impact of this theorist in the English-speaking world, to include in the U.S., 
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within the epoch of total war. This record includes a process of a misreading of Clausewitz 
in the English-speaking world, which says more about the reaction of British and American 
state and society to war in the 20th century than it might say, in fact, about the fundamentals 
of this theory and its capacity to influence contemporary action or not.  
 CLAUSEWITZ: THE “MADHI OF MASS” AND HARBINGER OF 
“TOTAL WAR” 
A dominant line of analysis in the period from 1919 until the recent past, especially 
within the English-speaking world, has been to use Clausewitz as a tool in a selective and 
often in a wholly faulty way to generalize about the changing face of war, and, more or 
often than not, to find fault in a variety of locales as pertain to state, armies, battle, and war 
itself. This school of thought, such as it is, often uses Clausewitz as a mirror to illustrate 
the author’s assumptions about war and theory, as well as doctrine in a manner that 
duplicates many of the errors about such theory that Clausewitz so rightly criticized in his 
own time.  One can say that within the reductionistic-extractive school encompasses the 
work and commentary of the First World War and inter-war British journalists and strategic 
theorists J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart. These two men, veterans of war on the 
western front, and figures in the interwar attempt to make sense of the phenomenon of total 
war in all its confusion, have had outsized impact in the U.S. on professional military 
education and the formation of doctrine until the present. When the Cold War ended a 
generation ago and war in many forms reasserted itself especially in the Middle East in the 
years from 1990 until 2003, the legacy of these two British officers and publicists was 
revived, even as tens of thousands of U.S. officers also read or misread Clausewitz.  
This school underwent a renaissance of a sort in the 1990s as the Israeli Martin Van 
Creveld and the British John Keegan penned responses to Clausewitzian thought that 
channeled many of the sentiments of the two British soldiers  of the World War and also 
of a British state and society that had been overwhelmed by war twice in a generation. 
Their respective arguments converge on several main points that often have little to do with 
the text of Clausewitz. Their body of work asserts that Clausewitzian theory and practice 
as found in German war since the 18th century is either directly or indirectly to blame for 
the expansion of war into total war. In an ahistorical manner, the critics contend that 
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Clausewitzian theory overemphasizes the  role of the European nation-state in the direction 
and organization of violence and armed force; and that Clausewitz improperly rationalizes 
war, which is essentially irrational and originates within and is sometimes bounded by the 
innate desire for combat internal to all human culture and society. 
1. J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart: Two Voices from the Trenches 
One can begin with the impact of the First World War on British letters and also on 
the British military profession, which, unlike its fate in the years 1815–1914,  emerged 
from the war deeply shaken along with so much else in British government and society 
where war had rebounded to Britain itself in a way that had not been seen for centuries.108 
J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart, both British Army First World War veterans, 
polemically asserted that Clausewitz was outdated and philosophically linked to modern 
industrialized warfare, even though technology does not really factor into his theory. With 
a misreading of the role of the British Army of the time as well as that of Field Marshall 
von Falkenhayn, Liddell Hart dubbed Clausewitz the “Madhi of Mass” and held him 
responsible for overemphasis on such huge battles as the Somme in 1916 that were devoid 
of political or strategic merit where British tactics produced no operational result.109  In 
error, Fuller held that Clausewitz himself only possessed a “vague understanding” of 
Napoleonic warfare—despite having fought against the revolutionary French armies in the 
late 18th century. Clausewitz, furthermore, served during the French invasion of Prussia in 
1805–6, and as part of the Prussian contingent in support of the Russian defensive-
offensive effort during the French invasion, surely had a great comprehension of French 
armies in the epoch than did either British military journalist in the 1920s and 1930s.  
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Per Fuller’s simplistic view which left out Moltke and Schlieffen, Clausewitz was 
responsible for the transmission of the “offensive principles of Napoleon” to the military 
landscape of the First and Second World Wars.110 The countless victims of these two 
conflicts, Fuller maintained, were those casualties to the “apotheosis of violence” whose 
genesis resided in Clausewitzian dogma of battle in war.111  Fuller contends that 
Clausewitzian thought as recorded in On War is thus:  “concentrate as much as possible, 
act as swiftly as possible, conquer and destroy the enemy’s armed force, get possession of 
the material elements of aggression…”.112 Such a statement is a caricature of Napoleon 
and Clausewitz in fact, but such misreading is the norm in this case.  
2. War Transformed and War as Culture: The Van Creveld and Keegan 
Critiques 
With the end of the Cold War and the rise of weapons of high accuracy and the 
instability that quickly showed itself in the Persian Gulf and former Yugoslavia, war 
reappeared despite the promise of an end of history. Military organization in the U.S. 
especially had grown greatly in size, and its professional military education establishment 
had reached a point in which it was a kind of perpetual motion machine eager for new ideas 
and new doctrine. One was told to make sense of the end of the Cold War and this 
reappearance of war—a reappearance that was not a reappearance at all when one considers 
the small war or lesser wars in the years 1945–1989. Simple answers were in demand, and 
two figures in particular were ready and able to provide these too facile readings of theory 
and war. These men were Martin Van Creveld and John Keegan, and they analyze 
Clausewitz via tendentious and polemical critiques that cannot stand careful inquiry.  
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For instance, the Israeli’s Van Creveld’s The Transformation of War (1991) 
contended that guerilla war, terrorism, and the progressive decay of state-centric 
“Westphalian” political institutions has rendered the so-called “Clausewitzian Universe” 
increasingly irrelevant.113 This assertion arose from Van Creveld’s Israeli biography and 
also from a sound knowledge of war in Europe which, in the year 1991, seemed to be on 
the cusp of a new age. The British journalist and Sandhurst instructor John Keegan wrongly 
contends, by way of a puzzling causal chain, that Clausewitzian logic fails in face of the 
observed, historical, and global reality that war is fundamentally about irrational forces, a 
statement that is astonishing, when one sees that Clausewitz wrote about this fact in huge 
detail.  Furthermore, taking a page from his seniors, Liddell Hart and Fuller, Keegan 
contends that Clausewitz is ultimately responsible for the excesses of modern industrialized 
warfare and bears “weighty responsibility” for the First World War in particular, despite 
the fact that Clausewitz died in 1831 at a time when industrialization was only beginning 
in Germany and this Englishman then manages to avoid any analysis of Moltke, Schlieffen, 
Ludendorff, or even Walter Rathenau.114  
These theories orient on two specific aspects of On War that emerge early on in the 
work:  Clausewitz’s theory, as to so called real war versus war in theory, that war arises 
from politics, and his exploration of so called and widely misunderstood “second trinity” 
that exerts influence on government, military forces, and the people who comprise a 
particular community. Clausewitz states the following regarding the connection between 
war and politics and policy: 
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When whole communities go to war—whole peoples, and especially 
civilized peoples—the reason always lies in some political situation, and the 
occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of 
policy. Were it a complete, untrammeled, absolute manifestation of 
violence (as the pure concept would require), war would of its own 
independent will usurp the place of policy the moment had brought it into 
being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its 
own nature…In reality war, as has been shown, is not like that. Its violence 
is not of the kind that explodes in a single discharge, but is the effect of 
forces that do not always develop in exactly the same manner or same 
degree.115 
Van Creveld argues that the emergence of guerilla war, terrorism, and other forms 
of fighting not explicitly linked to established and recognized states and armed forces is 
progressively rendering Clausewitzian philosophy “out of date”.116  The Clausewitzian 
Universe, as presented in On War, consists of organized armies, modern states in the mode 
of government that emerged in Europe after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, and a populace 
that is distinct from both the army and the state.117  Governments typically wage war 
within the confines of the Clausewitzian Universe.118  The chain of argument proceeds to 
consider the rise of “non-trinitarian war”—especially terrorism and guerilla war—that has 
occurred in the twentieth century, and contrasts this history with the precepts of the 
“Clausewitzian Universe”.119  Van Creveld proceeds to contend that On War is grounded 
in a fundamentally “rationalistic” and linearly-progressive “teleological” mode of thought 
with roots in the intellectual climate of Clausewitz’s time and concurs with Basil Liddell 
 
115 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter 1, Part 23, page 87.  
116 Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 58. 
117 Van Creveld, 41 for the roots of the thesis in Van Creveld’s appreciation of post-Peace of 
Westphalia legal distinctions between governments, peoples, and armies.  
118 Van Creveld, 49, for the contention that the Clausewitzian Universe “rests on the assumption that 
war is made predominately by states or, to be exact, by governments.” 
119 Van Creveld, 33 for the introduction of the “Clausewitzian Universe” construct; 35–42 for the 
extraction and development of the “trinitarian war” concept from On War and connection to the 
Clausewitzian Universe thesis; 20–21 for the association of “low intensity conflict” with non-trinitarian 
trend lines; 22 for commentary on the failure of counterinsurgency strategies as applied to guerilla war, 48–
49 for notes on various attempts by modern states to wage trinitarian war in the Clausewitzian model, and 
73 for how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the West Bank serves as an example of non-trinitarian warfare. 
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Hart’s thesis that the work is a sort of “Prussian Marseillaise which inflamed the body and 
intoxicated the mind” and served as a “clarion call for action” and battlefield brutality.120 
The Transformation of War briefly cites various cases of medieval and ancient war-
making that depart from the trinitarian construct introduced earlier in the work.121  Van 
Creveld contends, for instance, that the distribution of political authority in the medieval 
world as such meant that authority to declare and wage war resided with religious 
authorities, not with the secularized arrangement held to exist in Clausewitzian trinitarian 
warfare—a gross misreading of how state and estate worked, say, in the Thirty Years War 
in Habsburg, where religious and secular members of the first and second estate had a say 
in war or where prince bishops reigned in central Europe and so on .122  The argument 
proceeds to the conclusion that war-making has historically entered a realm where the 
perceived Clausewitzian distinction between war and rationalized state policy disappears: 
To sum up: Clausewitzian war as the continuation of policy only goes so far 
in explaining the historical facts. A very important form of conflict, namely 
war for existence [sic], fits into the framework with difficulty if at all; a war 
of this kind defies the laws of gravity, so to speak, causing cost-benefit 
calculations to be stood on their head. When this happens, strategic 
rationalist, far from assisting the attainment of victory, can be a prerequisite 
for defeat.123  
Van Creveld girds his thesis that perceived trinitarian boundaries between the state 
that initiates war policies, the military that executes it, and the people that wage it have 
completely merged—a idea that may or may not stand up to scrutiny. He described the 
state of affairs in Israel during the 1967 Six Day War: “War is Israel, and Israel is War”.124 
 
120 Van Creveld,  64 for how On War is grounded in the “rationalistic” intellectual climate of the 
early 19th century; 65 for the citation of Liddell Hart’s “Prussian Marseillaise” commentary. 
121 Van Creveld, 127–129 for notes on the medieval arrangement of war-making power; 131 for notes 
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conduct of warfare; 136 for additional notes on the historical right that religious authorities possessed to 
declare war, and 139 for holy war as an example of historical warfare that departs from the Clausewitzian 
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122 Van Creveld, 136. 
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Subsequently, Van Creveld contends that Clausewitz never considers [sic] specifically 
“why men risk their lives,” and cites cultural and individual motivations ranging from the 
“counting coup” that historically occurred in premodern societies, to the various 
motivations present amongst the combatants in the epic Iliad, and to the individual desire 
to seek danger and glory.125  Van Creveld ends this chain of argument after identifying 
war as “sport” that is inherently interesting and divorced from higher-order attempts to 
rationalize.126   
The Transformation of War applies the central argument regarding the progressive 
obsolescence of trinitarian warfare and the “Clausewitzian Universe” toward consideration 
of the future of warfare and the modern state. Predictions in the closing passages of the 
book range from the erroneous prognostication that low intensity conflict will 
progressively end modern states; that low intensity conflict may extend to the United States 
and feature the operation of organizations like the “Assassins” found in ancient warfare; 
and that modern states may dissolve into city-states and political arrangements similar to 
those found in medieval feudal times—a generation later this idea does not seem to have 
become a fact at all.127  The final threads of the argument predict the end of state-level 
investment in military technology, the expansion of the private security industry, the 
employment of increasingly “small and cheap” military equipment items, and ultimately a 
 
125 Van Creveld, 160–161 for digression on Clausewitz’s avoidance of considering “why men risk 
their lives”; 162 for notes on the Iliad; 164 for the argument that danger is the “why,” not the 
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terrorism can at best be contained; 195 for the argument that the state has “lost the monopoly” on violence; 
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possible “restoration of the medieval situation.”128  Van Creveld concludes his work on 
the note that, in order to account for and understand “the occurrence of war, it is not 
necessary to postulate the existence of any ulterior motives other than war itself.”129 All 
of this sold books to the PME and doctrine establishment in the 1990s, but what such wild 
ideas have to do with the truth is another question altogether.  
Van Creveld bases his argument on one primary thesis which crafts a straw-man 
version of perhaps the most important part of On War: the discussion of the trinity in Book 
I, in order to avoid the troublesome portions of On War which disprove the thesis that the 
“Clausewitzian Universe” exists as an increasingly irrelevant extension of the European 
world as it stood in 1648. The first main argument is that the emergence of combatants and 
battle that does not align with that seen during the era of both industrialized war in the 
middle of the 20th century and during the preceding century indicates that the essence of 
war itself has changed. Van Creveld mistakes the shift in the means of battle for a change 
in the nature of war itself, and indeed ignores the critical portion of On War that counters 
this point.  
Clausewitz does not explain war itself in terms of the means of battle or particular 
tactics employed by combatants. War, as Clausewitz explains within Book I of On War, 
consists of the dynamic interplay and influence between primordial violence and anger, 
battlefield chance and uncertainty amidst friction, and the realm of politics and policy. This 
complex interaction generates and modulates how war manifests in the real world, and also 
how close it approximates the “total war” as conceived in theory by Clausewitz. Van 
Creveld, it seems, prefers to interpret the Clausewitzian trinity as the “second trinity” 
consisting of the people, army, and government, to the deliberate exclusion of the true heart 
of Clausewitz’s complex argument. The Transformation of War is perhaps best read as a 
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military technology research, development, and fielding; 207 on the likely expansion of the private security 
industry; 210 on the likely increase in use of small and inexpensive military “gadgets” on the battlefield; 
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men in itself in a world where “women like those men who are prepared to fight on their behalf” and  226 
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cautionary tale of how one specific nation’s military experience marked by victory along 
lines generally recognized as conventional transformed after contact with the popular 
energy and passion induced during such events as the occupation of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip and 1982 Lebanon invasion. One has also to say that the book in the year 2021 
has itself become an artifact of another era, i.e., the end of the Cold War and the pivotal 
period between 1990 and 2001. This epoch was characterized by a military realignment 
amid a revival of war and a search for new roles and missions that made this work appealing 
to stake holders in theory, doctrine and order of battle who had to assert their continuing 
worth amid budget cutbacks and the perpetual confusion about the changing character of 
war in detail versus its essence.  
The instructor in Sandhurst, the British figure John Keegan issued a polemical 
warning to those who delve into Clausewitzian philosophy and On War: 
In the practice of war making, it is to the principles of Clausewitz that the 
statesman and the supreme commander still turn; in the truthful description 
of war, however, the eye-witness and the historian must flee from 
Clausewitz’s methods, despite the fact that Clausewitz himself was both an 
eye-witness and a historian of war who must have seen and could have 
written of a great deal that found no place in his theories.130 
Keegan contended that the Clausewitzian maxim, extracted from On War, that “war 
is the continuation of policy by other means”131 fails against consideration of the observed 
historical record that reveals that warfare fundamentally involves forces that operate 
outside the rationalized state-centric processes that he deems to be inherent to 
Clausewitzian philosophy. “War,” Keegan posits in a bold, yet nebulous fashion, 
“embraces much more than politics: that it is always an expression of culture, often a 
determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself.”132  Moreover, Keegan 
sites Clausewitzian philosophy as rooted in the regimental culture endemic in Prussia in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries—a culture that emphasized “total 
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obedience, single-minded courage, self-sacrifice” and “honor”.133 Clausewitz, Keegan 
argues, proceeded to embed these regimental values into his political philosophy.134 The 
acerbic argument in A History of Warfare proceeds to identify Clausewitz as the 
“ideological father” of the First World War, since the ideology of “true war” transmitted 
from Clausewitzian philosophy and has as a legacy the “appalling fate” of First World War 
armies.135  
Keegan develops his argument that factors which are culturally-rooted and external 
to the state-centric Clausewitzian conception of war as continuation of policy by describing 
how other, non-European, societies waged war: “Good historian though he was, Clausewitz 
allowed two institutions—state and regiment—that circumscribed his own perception of 
the world to dominate his thinking so narrowly that he denied himself the room the observe 
how different war might be in societies where state and regiment were alien concepts.”136 
Keegan initially considers the Polynesian society that settled Easter Island, and concludes 
that that society pursued total war towards its own annihilation:  “War, when it came in a 
‘true’ form to that corner of Polynesia called Easter Island, proved to be a termination first 
of politics, then of culture, ultimately almost of life itself.”137   
The argument proceeds to consider the African Zulu culture as it developed in the 
nineteenth century, and posits that the Zulu leader Shaka “was a perfect Clausewitzian” 
who structured a military organization in order to secure his tribal culture with “dramatic 
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efficiency” that eventually disintegrated the Zulu nation.138 Keegan proceeds to appreciate 
how the Mameluke slave soldiers found in many Muslim-majority states in premodern and 
early modern times operated within a military system and culture that secured and 
perpetuated societal hierarchies at the cost of military efficiency.139 Analysis of the 
Tokugawa-era Japanese samurai warrior culture concludes Keegan’s cultural historical 
survey and concludes on the note that the case of the longevity and decline of the Japanese 
samurai lends weight to the thesis that “war may be, among many other things, the 
perpetuation of a culture by its own means.”140   
Keegan ambitiously concludes his cultural study on the argument that, ultimately, 
Clausewitz sidelined cultural considerations when developing his philosophy of war: 
Clausewitz did seem to perceive politics as an autonomous activity, the 
meeting-place of rational forms and emotional forces, in which reason and 
feeling are determinants but in which culture – that great cargo of shared 
beliefs, values, associations, myths, taboos, imperatives, customs, 
traditions, manners, and ways of thought, speech and artistic expression 
which ballast every society – plays no determining role.141 
A History of Warfare concludes on the argument that culture determines the nature 
of war and that “wisdom” is to be had in refusal to site politics and war “within the same 
continuum,” lest societies risk the fate of those who, like the Easter Islanders, pursued true 
war to the end.142  
 
138 Keegan, 32. See 28–32 for Keegan’s historical account of how Shaka Zulu cast aside tribal-
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his formations, such as the use of more advanced bladed weapons and more lethal and maneuverable close-
order formations. See 31–32 for the failure of Zulu military culture to adapt to the introduction of firearms 
in their region.  
139 Keegan, 32. 
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In a manner that says more about how certain British military figures over 
generalize from a record that may bear on the issue or not, Keegan’s argument crafts a 
Clausewitzian straw-man similar to that found in The Transformation of War. His core 
analytical construct of “culture” identified above—“that great cargo of shared beliefs, 
values, associations, myths, taboos, imperatives, customs, traditions, manners, and ways of 
though, speech, and artistic expression which ballast every society”—is so broad that it 
defies systematic refutation and Clausewitz surely is aware of these forces in his theory 
and well embraces him despite the Sandhurst instructor’s statement to the contrary. 
Keegan’s thesis is rooted in several other propositions which extract and distort a few parts 
of Clausewitz’s thought, and On War in particular. Keegan casts Prussian military culture 
at the time of Clausewitz in a mold that is ahistorical and betrays Keegan’s own failing as 
a scholar of war in Europe, as Paret’s Clausewitz and the State’s account of the inner 
Prussian reform movement indicates.143  
Keegan also argues that Clausewitzian thought is excessively “state-centric,” 
presumably in the sense of the European state as it stood in the early 19th century, and 
therefore inapplicable to other societies and peoples who might live within a different sort 
of community.144 Clausewitz does indeed identify “government” as corresponding to one 
point of the trinity—“its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes 
it subject to reason alone”145—identified in Book I, he never at any point in the book 
outlines the real or theoretical form in which a state, government, or political organization 
might take. War consists of the complex and ultimately unpredictable interplay of 
organized violence, chance, and politics and policy, and Clausewitz never claimed to 
develop a theory of war that could predict or explain how battle and fighting might occur 
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at various points in history.146 Keegan begins A History of Warfare by recounting his 
formative experience at the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and his 
observations regarding the stratified culture of the instructor cadre at that school as 
demarcated by military badges, traditions, and uniforms—perhaps this rarified 
environment, in the end, shaped Keegan’s thought as much as command and staff 
experience in the Prussian and Russian armies during the French revolutionary and 
Napoleonic wars influenced Carl von Clausewitz.  
 CLAUSEWITZ IN AMERICA, THE CENTER OF GRAVITY, AND 
STRATEGY AFTER DEFEAT 
The U.S. military went in the period from 1900 to 1960 from being a minor force 
in world affairs to a dominant one, a process that proceeded with great speed but also a 
procedure that did not have a single unifying theory of war in the sense of German idealism. 
Itself a fairly new phenomenon, U.S. strategic thought, after the end of the Second World 
War, struggled to comprehend and respond to several phenomena well embodied in 
Clausewitz’s thought. The first was the apparent world conflict of ideology in the grey zone 
of two political systems in struggle on a global scale. Added to this fact was the prospect 
of atomic and thermonuclear war and the attendant involvement of extreme violence, 
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chance, will, and annihilation of armies and societies.147 At the same time, such 
experiences as the conflict in Korea in 1950–1953 seemed to defy theory with a new kind 
of so called “limited war.” The late 1950s Single Integrated Operational Plan 62 (SIOP 
62), for instance, well captures the scale of the destruction envisioned within U.S. strategic 
planning circles during the early Cold War.148 U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force strategists, 
in particular, grew to believe that strategy amounted to the development, acquisition, and 
employment of strategic aerospace weapons and the destruction of associated target lists, 
themselves developed to a scale which required progressively more assigned warheads, 
 
147 Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in Makers of Modern 
Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986), 737 for the impact of the Berlin Crisis in 1948 and the development of U.S. atomic war plans; 739 
for the transition of the U.S. defense industrial establishment to the mass production of atomic weapons in 
the 1950s, 740–741 for the genesis of the Eisenhower “massive retaliation” strategy; 744 for the integration 
of nuclear weapons into NATO strategy during the “New Look” time period; 746–748 for how U.S. and 
NATO leaders and planners grappled with the distinction between “tactical” and “strategic” nuclear 
weapons in the 1950s; 752–753 for the emergence of concepts such as “first strike” and “second strike” 
capabilities as conceptualized by Albert Wohlstetter; 754 for the Kennedy administration desire to stabilize 
development of nuclear weapons and war plans; 757–758 for Secretary of Defense McNamara’s 
conceptualization of “Mutual Assured Destruction;” 760–761 for the transition between the focus on arms 
control in the 1970s to the Reagan administration Strategic Defense Initiative and renewed focus on 
fighting and winning nuclear war; 763–764 for the strategic differences between Herman Kahn’s 
“dominate” approach to nuclear war and Thomas Schelling’s “deter” approach to nuclear war; 772 for the 
adoption of the “flexible response” option within NATO strategy in 1967 that accepted that conventional 
war in Europe need not trigger a nuclear response; 775 for the U.S. nuclear strategy of “escalation 
dominance” and focus on “selective nuclear options” within an overall theoretical framework that assumed 
some sort of staggered approach towards nuclear war.  
148 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), 269–
270 for details on the initial brief of SIOP-62 to Secretary of Defense McNamara. SIOP-62 entailed the 
detonation of 3,423 nuclear warheads totaling 7,847 megatons of destructive power and the estimated death 
of 285 million people within Russia and China. SIOP-62 made little distinction between states within the 
“Sino-Soviet bloc,” and covered targets in China, for instance, because they were in the path of U.S. 
strategic bomber routes into Russia. See also , for the observation that the mode of attack within SIOP-62 is 
best described as a “spasm” that made no attempt to tailor the nuclear offensive to the specific nation 
within the Sino-Soviet bloc actually involved in the crisis at hand. 
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and the personnel, aircraft, submarines, and missiles needed to destroy them.149 
Ultimately, the logic that strategy equaled technology that in turn delivered unbound 
nuclear annihilation collapsed any rational political purpose as related in On War and 
Clausewitz’s use of the trinity analogy to capture the interplay of violence and anger, 
chance, and political reason. 
The second challenge to U.S. strategic logic was the growing frequency of anti-
colonial and irregular or small warfare in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa. U.S. 
strategy shifted from solely focusing on nuclear war and nuclear deterrence to the challenge 
of waging counterinsurgency campaigns amongst the people and against political cadres 
dedicated to mobilizing popular support, violently seizing state power, and annihilating the 
legacy political order.150 President Kennedy’s “Flexible Response” strategy marked an 
attempt to channel some of the colonial warfare practices of the French and the British in 
order to meet and defeat war akin to that waged by the Algerian FLN against the French 
colonial administration, and, most prominently, the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.151  
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The U.S. withdrew, defeated, from Vietnam in 1975. Thinking about, planning for, 
and practicing for large scale warfare reassumed pride of place within the U.S. military 
after a nearly nonexistent period of reflection on the lessons of Vietnam. The U.S. Army 
in the form of Colonel Harry Summers, for instance, rapidly distanced itself from the 
memory of Vietnam, commissioned a private think tank to conduct an after-action report 
that was quickly shelved, and transitioned to the welcome focus on the need to fight on 
land in Europe after the 1973 October war showed the changing face of tactics and 
operations in the Soviet school of war.152 As this process operated in the 1970s, persons 
in war colleges and think tanks in the latter half of the decade found Clausewitz and On 
War. The process of the incorporation of Clausewitz and On War illuminates the 
reductionistic-extractive approach and the historic-contextual approach as they have 
manifested within the U.S. military-intellectual establishment. That is, the story of the 
reading and interpretation of the text expresses the spirit of the time dominated by an 
imperative of professional soldiers to shift the blame for defeat in Vietnam to civilians and 
to use Clausewitz as a vehicle to do so, while, at the same time, upholding the sanctity of 
the military profession based on the canon of classic thought by soldiers, such as 
Clausewitz, about war. Civilians had had too great a say in matters of war, and the outcome 
in Vietnam was the result.153   
1. Clausewitz and the Response to Vietnam, the COG, and the OODA 
Loop 
U.S. military officers now encountered the thought of Carl von Clausewitz amid 
U.S. military doctrine taught in professional military education from the tactical level to 
the highest echelons of defense and military strategy in the war colleges and beyond. 
Christopher Bassford, a former Marine and faculty member of the Marine Corps University 
and National War College, notes that there is no evidence that any U.S. military thinker 
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read or had access to On War before the 1890s.154  U.S. military officers did have 
intermittent exposure to Clausewitz in the early twentieth century, and President 
Eisenhower and General George Patton displayed interest in Clausewitz on an individual 
level but one struggles to know what this fact means in the waging of the second and Cold 
War.155 With a re emphasis on military classics and the prospect of further conflict with 
the USSR as the Warsaw Pact modernized and expanded its order of battle, the U.S. 
military educational and doctrinal establishment notably turned towards On War after the 
withdrawal and defeat in Vietnam, as seen in the adoption of the newly published Paret 
translation by the National War College, Air War College, and Army War College between 
1976 and 1981.156   
U.S. military thought enthusiastically embraced Clausewitz in the wake of the 
defeat in Vietnam. Colonel Summers’ On Strategy well summarizes the interest and line 
of inquiry via which U.S. military thinkers approached Clausewitz. Summers applies 
various Clausewitzian maxims to analyze the performance and defeat of the U.S. in 
Vietnam.157  He arrives at a number of conclusions as overlaid against the historical record 
and U.S. Army list of the “principles of war” at the time.158 Summers, for instance, argues 
that U.S. strategy failed to properly identify and attack the enemy “center of gravity” during 
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– Summers, citing Clausewitz, contends that this is but one side of the activity of war which also consists of 
actually waging war. 
158 Summers, 95 for consideration of the U.S. record in Vietnam against the requirements of the 
“objective” principle of war and Clausewitzian thought; 108–110 for reflection on how well U.S. 
performance satisfied requirements of the “offensive”; 128–129 for integration of analysis of the North 
Vietnamese center of gravity into consideration regarding U.S. adherence to the principles of “mass, 
economy of force, and maneuver,” 147 for how “unity of command” was generally absent from planning in 
Washington and in the Vietnam theater, and 151–157 for how the U.S. attained varying levels of “surprise” 
despite generally poor levels of “security.”  
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the war, which Summers contends could have been the North Vietnamese Army positioned 
within North Vietnam, or Hanoi, or somehow the “community of interest” between North 
Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China.159 Some of his observations orient on the conflation 
of tactical success and operations as on display in counterinsurgency doctrine at the time, 
and his approach is fairly critical of counterinsurgency doctrine.160  The real crux of his 
argument is that misalignment between the three points of the Clausewitzian “trinity,” —
which he defines as the American people, government, and military—led to the defeat of 
U.S. arms in Vietnam.161  This willful use of the so called “trinity” as the essence of 
Clausewitz is a selective reading of Clausewitz, since Clausewitz associates the people, 
army, and government with the “first trinity” of primordial violence and anger, chance, and 
subordination to policy. This fact gets lost in the process, in which professional soldiers 
are at pains to demonstrate that the elite control of policy and strategy must always be in 
the hands of soldiers, not civilians.  
Today, U.S. military students typically encounter Clausewitzian thought via the 
various professional military education (PME) programs which introduce concepts such as 
 
159 Summers, 128–130. 
160 Summers, 73 and 77 for how U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine assumed dogmatic status within the 
U.S. defense establishment, partially via the association with in-vogue academic-social science theories; 78 
for how counterinsurgency doctrine obscured the “true nature” of military force. 
161 Summers, 5–7. 
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the “center of gravity” (COG) 162 and “friction” .163  U.S. students who conduct follow-on 
research into how the U.S. defense intellectual community has considered the center of 
gravity will discover that scholars and commentators have proceeded to refine and apply 
Clausewitzian thought in order to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of adversaries 
across a number of analytical categories. Joe Strange, for instance, identifies the array of 
sometimes contradictory definition of the center of gravity concept within U.S. military 
doctrine and proposed a refined construct that considers adversarial missions and that 
critical source of strength—the “center of gravity”—needed to accomplish it, “critical 
 
162 See Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (Newport: Naval War College, 
2009), VII-13 to VII-14 for the introduction of the “center of gravity” as “as source of massed strength – 
physical or moral – or a source of leverage whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or 
destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy’s or one’s own ability to accomplish a given 
political/military objective.”  Also, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Planning JP 5-0 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 2020) IV-22 for the identification and subsequent 
analysis of the center of gravity as “the source of power or strength that enables a military force to achieve 
its objective and is what an opposing force can orient its actions against that will lead to enemy failure.”  
See also U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting MCDP-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), 46, for 
discussion of the center of gravity as factors critical to the enemy which might consist of resolve, morale, 
armored forces, or aviation strength, or perhaps critical terrain or relationships between components of an 
enemy combat system:  “In short, centers of gravity are any important sources of strength. If they are 
friendly centers of gravity, we want to protect them, and if they are enemy centers of gravity, we want to 
take them away.” 
163 See U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, MCDP 1-0, 5–6 for discussion of “friction” as “the force that 
resists all action and saps energy. It makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible.”  See 
also Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (Newport: Naval War College, 2009), 
III-34 for how “Clausewitzian friction and the ‘fog of war’ is an inherent feature of warfare at any level” 
and III-35 for discussion of how “Friction is the main reason a military action differs in its execution from 
the one planned…the principle causes of friction are the enemy’s plans, human errors, fatigue, terrain, 
weather, inadequate or inaccurate information, and pure luck and chance.  
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requirements” aligned to accomplish that mission, and the “critical vulnerabilities” 
associated with those requirements.164 
John Boyd, an Air Force fighter pilot and Pentagon staff officer involved in aircraft 
design, delivered his “Pattern of Conflicts” brief to Marine Corps officer students in 
Quantico and contributed to the intellectual foundation of the Marine Corps “maneuver 
warfare” approach to fighting that channeled both Clausewitzian maxims and some of the 
dictums of Sun Tzu via the “Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA)” doctrine.165  Boyd 
favored Sun Tzuian military philosophy over Clausewitz, and critiqued Clausewitzian 
thought for two primary reasons: he contended that Clausewitz oriented excessively on the 
need for “decisive battle” and on “exhausting the enemy” via attrition-style warfare 
emphasizing force-on-force warfare and incremental degradation of enemy combat 
formations.166  
“Patterns of Conflict” oriented on Clausewitz’s description of the “center of 
gravity” and posited that the logical progression of thought aimed at countering and 
 
164 Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian 
Foundation So That We Can All Speak The Same Language (Quantico: Marine Corps University, 1996), 
38, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA502026 for the observation that U.S. doctrine has generated a 
“smorgasbord” of varying understandings revolving around the center of gravity concept; 43 for the thesis 
that the U.S. defense community should adopt an analytical construct that considers enemy strengths, 
mission, and weaknesses within the lens of the center of gravity, critical capabilities aligned to support that 
center of gravity, critical requirements enabling those capabilities, and targetable critical vulnerabilities to 
be selected and considered during the military planning process; 44 for the identification of “moral and 
political” centers of gravity; 57-63 for the analysis of U.S. Pacific Fleet centers of gravity and associated 
critical capabilities and requirements during the Second World War; 64 for the argument that any “critical 
vulnerability” is best determined by analyzing critical requirements; 74 for the admonition that “a center of 
gravity cannot also be a critical vulnerability;” and 76 for the assertion that a critical vulnerability “is the 
thing which makes a center of gravity vulnerable.” See also 87 for the observation that, while important, 
terrain and meteorological features do not qualify as centers of gravity, and 93-94 for Strange’s critique of 
the approach taken towards the “center of gravity” resident within U.S. service doctrine in the mid-1990s. 
165  See Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 376–379 for the initial 
presentation of “Patterns of Conflict” to U.S. Marine students in Quantico in 1980; 381 on the integration 
of Boyd’s briefings with Michael Wyly’s focus on German-inspired tactics; and 391 for the association of 
Boyd with the genesis of the precursor to MCDP-1 Warfighting: Fleet Marine Force Manual-1, 
Warfighting. Also, see MCDP-1 Warfighting, 102, footnote 18 for reference to Boyd’s observe-orient-
decide-act (OODA) decision making model and how rapid cycling of the model facilitates tempo and 
advantage in combat. 
166 Coram, Boyd, 330–334 for notes on Boyd’s thoughts on Clausewitzian philosophy, see also 
Hammond, The Mind of War, 129–130 for notes on Boyd’s reduction of Clausewitzian thought to “decisive 
battle” and “attrition”; see also 153 for notes on the evolution of the maneuver and attrition lens of analysis. 
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destroying any adversary center of gravity would terminate in pitting strength against 
strength.167  “Patterns of Conflict” also contested the perceived linear and rational 
approach towards warfare and state policy within On War.168  Additionally, Boyd argued 
within his Patterns of Conflict brief that Clausewitz oriented excessively on a culminating 
“decisive battle” and “method and routine at the tactical level.”169  Clausewitzian 
philosophy as applied to the battlefield, Boyd ultimately contended, results in a 
“bloodbath”.170  
The line of argument here is similar to that seen within the Fuller, Keegan and Van 
Creveld critiques, misrepresents the line of argument and thought as actually resident 
within On War, and perhaps seeks to reinforce and advertise the “OODA” heuristic by 
means of a Clausewitzian straw man reduced to a few bulletized dictums relayed via slide 
show. Boyd’s analysis—in the vein of Liddell Hart, Fuller, Van Creveld, and Keegan—
sidelines Clausewitz’s true trinity and misrepresents the complex relationship that 
Clausewitz posited exists between the political activity of any community and organized 




167 Ian Brown, A New Conception of War:  John Boyd, the U. S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare 
(Quantico, Marine Corps University Press, 2018), 
https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/ANewConceptionOfWar.pdf?ver=2018-11-08-094859-167, 222–223 
for Boyd’s argument that, per Clausewitzian logic, the center of gravity is “where mass concentrates most 
densely, then you go after that, then you’ve got strength against strength. That’s where the mass is 
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notes from the “Patterns of Conflict” brief that contend that “Clausewitz did not see that many 
noncooperative, or conflicting, centers of gravity paralyze an adversary by denying him the opportunity to 
operate in a directed fashion…hence they impede vigorous activity and magnify friction.”   
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III. GERMAN WARFARE, THE U.S. ARMY, AND WAR IN 
EUROPE 
American engagement with European military thought as reflected in the interest 
in German wartime operations, tactics, and campaign histories has generally unfolded in 
the context of the historical relationship between American and European militaries. 
American interest in war in Europe has typically confined itself to interest in the conduct 
of war—tactics, operational history, and “how to fight” curricula—and not inquiry into or 
appreciation of the political, social, cultural, and economic roots of war. U.S. interest in 
the history of war in Europe also intersects with the ebb and flow of American involvement 
in the security affairs of the continent. Specifically, the imperative to fight wars in Europe 
has prompted an urgent search for answers about how to best fight on the continent. The 
historical record indicates that Americans are most interested in reducing the story of war 
in Europe to those key points seemingly best related to the perceived strategic, operational, 
and tactical challenges at hand.  
The story of how U.S. military planners and historians interacted with the legacy 
of German arms and total war in Europe in the wake of the Second World War illustrates 
this point. Deteriorating relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union prompted U.S. 
military planners to draft a series of emergency war plans that progressed to require that 
U.S. ground forces in Europe be prepared wage defensive battle against numerically 
superior Soviet conventional forces whilst the U.S. Strategic Air Command carried out an 
atomic bombing campaign. U.S. Army planners, therefore, were inclined to seek solutions 
to the land defense problem from Wehrmacht officers cooperating with U.S. Army 
historians. The select lessons transmitted from these captured officers, who had their own 
agenda within the context of postwar Germany, helped shift the U.S. Army to orient on 
“mobile defense” as the solution to the land defense problem in Europe. 
The reality of German warfare diverges substantially from the myth. Gerhard Gross 
argues as such in The Myth and Reality of German Warfare and contends that the historical 
record indicates that the Second World War German operational approach towards warfare 
aligned with the historical approach of past German operational planners: namely, that 
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German planners sought to solve strategic problems via rapid offensive action that, in the 
end, was unsustainable. Mark Mazower’s Hitler’s Empire illuminates the murderous 
impact of racialized National Socialist policies in Central Europe and highlights the savage 
and ultimately self-defeating nature of German activity as manifested in operationalized 
plunder, ersatz diplomacy, and unprecedented atrocity. Additional scholars also examine 
the history of the Soviet war effort, and thoroughly undermine the “Myth of the Eastern 
Front” belief that the Soviets overcame the Wehrmacht via mass and materiel alone. 
 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S. AS A EUROPEAN MILITARY POWER 
The European roots of U.S. military thought precede the formation of the modern 
American republic. In the period prior to 1781, European officers mentored and instructed 
the revolutionary Continental Army during in the mode of the armies of the dynastic and 
absolutist powers that reigned in continental Europe during the American Revolution.171  
The Continental Army, though modelled and employed in combat in a fashion similar to 
that observed on the European battlefield, transitioned to a militia-type organization more 
akin to that seen in medieval and early modern times in Britain and Europe.172  European, 
and specifically French, military thought transmitted as the curricula of French artillery 
and military engineering girded the intellectual foundations of the new U.S. Military 
Academy in the early 1800s.173  West Point, and the U.S. Army, awarded pride of place 
to the military engineers trained in the French school of fortification, artillery, and military 
engineering.174  Linn contends that the U.S. Army experience in the Mexican-American 
 
171 Abenheim and Halladay, Soldiers, War, Knowledge, and Citizenship: German-American Essays 
on Civil Military Relations 100–101.  
172 Abenheim and Halladay,  101. 
173 Abenheim and Halladay, 102. 
174 Abenheim and Halladay, 102–103. See also Linn, The Echo of Battle, 12–13 for the involvement 
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the “intellectual and technical elite,” in the Fortification Board which 
formed in the wake of the War of 1812, which oriented on continental defense via scientific-technical 
principles best grasped by a military elite.  
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war of 1846–1848 confirmed existent biases towards technical training and the imperative 
that citizen-soldiers be led by the West Point-produced elite.175   
U.S. officers once again looked to war in Europe during the Crimean War in the 
1850s, and a team of U.S. Army officers travelled to Crimea in order to study the 
conflict.176  U.S. Army engineers cited the reduction of fortified defenses under artillery 
fire and the seizure of Russian-held Sevastopol as evidence to support the thesis that the 
U.S. Congress should fully fund an ambitious coastal fortification system.177  The mode 
of interaction that saw U.S. interest orient on Europe reversed during the Civil War years, 
and European observers, as Abenheim and Halladay contend, for reasons of class and 
simple bigotry generally dismissed the policy and performance of the Union as it unfolded, 
even as the final combat in the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War transitioned to irregular 
warfare in the Paris Commune.178  The figures Captain Alfred Mahan and Emory Upton 
generated the military thought that interpreted British and Prussian military experience as 
suitable for application to growing U.S. appetites for imperial expansion.179 
The U.S. was a “European power” prior to 1917 by virtue of the aforementioned 
interest in and absorption of European military thought via tactical observation, 
appreciation of European military thought, and direct importation of European military 
curricula. The American Expeditionary Force initially lacked the command experience and 
training necessary to meet the requirements of the Western Front, trained under the tutelage 
of the French Army, and eventually integrated into the French-British line.180  U.S. troops 
fought in and occupied European territory until 1923 and then withdrew in the aftermath 
of the U.S. Senate veto of League of Nations membership and the growing isolationism on 
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the American domestic front.181  The American G.I. returned to Europe in 1944, advanced 
to Berlin in 1945, and remained as a type of occupier foreign to the experience of the 
shattered continent and, in particular, occupied Germany.182 
 1945-1950:  U.S. EMERGENCY WAR PLANS AND DEFENSE ON LAND 
IN EUROPE  
The U.S. presence in Europe at the end of the Second World War initially retracted 
and demobilized in a rapid fashion similar to that seen during 1918–1923. This aligned 
with the global demobilization of the vast American defense establishment as in times past. 
The U.S. Army, worldwide, numbered 5,984,114 soldiers in June 1945 and swiftly 
demobilized to 683,837 soldiers as of June 1947.183  The U.S. Army ground force 
consisted of 91 divisions in August 1945 and drew down to a total of ten divisions in June 
1947, all of which were dedicated to occupation duties in primarily Europe and Japan.184  
U.S. military planners concluded that American arms could only defend the Western 
Hemisphere, conduct postwar occupation duties, and conduct “minor overseas operations” 
if needed.185    
U.S. planners, however, would soon orient on the looming Soviet threat in the wake 
of the 1948 Berlin Blockade and allied airlift, the communist-backed coup in 
Czechoslovakia, the collapse and flight of the Chinese Nationalists to Taiwan in 1949, and 
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 as evidence to support the imperative that U.S. 
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and allied forces must posture to hold Western Europe against Soviet expansionism and 
aggression.186  
1. The Soviet Conventional Threat and BROILER, FLEETWOOD, and 
TROJAN 
U.S. planners generated war plan BROILER in 1947 and included the “first 
operationally oriented target list” which targeted 24 Soviet cities with 34 atomic bombs.187 
J.C.S. planners then developed emergency war plan HALFMOON in 1948 in order to 
provide authoritative emergency war planning guidance to theater commanders and 
uniformed service leadership, since BROILER had never been forwarded out of the J.C.S. 
as guidance.188 HALFMOON, quickly renamed FLEETWOOD, also tasked U.S. forces 
to immediately withdraw to the Rhine River after the initial Soviet attack and then 
withdraw to French and Italian ports in order to evacuate the continent and prepare to re-
attack after a U.S. atomic blitz in the vein of the Second World War strategic bombing 
campaign mounted from the United Kingdom and other allied-held basing areas.189 War 
plan TROJAN, approved in December 1948, replaced FLEETWOOD and subsequently 
slated 133 atomic bombs for use against 70 Soviet cities in order to “exploit the destructive 
and psychological power of atomic weapons against the vital elements of Soviet war-
making capacity…”.190   
 
186 Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume II, 62–63 for the response of U.S. military and 
civilian leadership to the Czechoslovakia coup in 1948; 72–73 for the initial implementation of NSC Action 
84 and President Truman’s direction of resources to the airlift effort; and 83–85 for a summary of the 
interaction, or general lack thereof, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Truman administration. See also 
Abenheim and Halladay, 116–117 on how U.S. policy towards European security reoriented from 
occupation to alliance-centered defense in the immediate aftermath of the aforementioned crises.  
187 David Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–
1960,” International Security 7, no. 4 (1983): 12, 15–16, https://doi.org/10.2307/2626731. 
188 Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume II, 156. 
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190 Condit, 158. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff, Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting 
From the Strategic Air Offensive, J.C.S. 1953/1, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 13, 1949), 
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U.S. military leaders directed JCS planners to assess the likely outcome of the 
atomic war planning within TROJAN. The now-declassified report, designated J.C.S. 
1953/1, made a number of seemingly contradictory conclusions that, in the end, encouraged 
the growth of the U.S. atomic stockpile.191 J.C.S. 1953/1 also assessed that the Soviet 
Union could field a larger conventional force within Europe, overrun U.S. and allied 
combat formations in Europe, reach the Rhine River in 5–10 days after initiation of the 
offensive, and advance to the Atlantic Ocean within 50–60 days of the start of war.192   
The report also concluded that the Soviets would still be able to quickly overrun 
U.S. and allied forces in Europe even if atomic weapons were deployed as planned in 
TROJAN and, moreover, that atomic warfare would generate “adverse psychological and 
retaliatory reactions” against the U.S. and allies and encourage the Soviets to use 
“maximum retaliatory measures”.193 Simply put, the study concluded that the use of 
American atomic weapons against Soviet targets could, in fact, strengthen the resolve of 
the Russian people. Paradoxically, J.C.S. 1953/1 concluded that, despite these initial 
conclusions, atomic weapons should serve as a “major element of Allied military strength” 
and the best way to quickly damage key parts of the Soviet war machine: “the advantages 
of its early use would be transcending.”194 J.C.S. 1953/1 made the following key 
recommendation that President Truman reviewed and accepted: “Every reasonable effort 
should be devoted to providing the means to be prepared for prompt and efficient delivery 
of the maximum numbers of atomic bombs to appropriate target systems.”195  
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2. The Economics of National Defense and Nuclear War Plans  
U.S. planners also had to manage domestic economic considerations over the 
course of war plan development. The U.S. national budget and the defense budget that were 
in effect during the Truman administration decisively shaped the course of U.S. nuclear 
warfighting planning. Rosenberg argues that President Truman’s decision to restrict the 
U.S. defense budget to $14.4 billion in order to combat inflation presented a dilemma to 
U.S. defense planners: how should the U.S. best align financial means and military force 
structure against defense requirements?196 U.S. military planners, such as Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) commander General Curtis LeMay, endorsed and advocated for strategic 
atomic bombing and development of the U.S. nuclear weapons program as a cost-effective 
means by which to assure U.S. security.197 As Rosenberg concludes: “The president’s 
continuing refusal to budget adequate conventional alternatives thus made the United 
States virtually dependent on the atomic bomb.”198   
The J.C.S. replaced TROJAN with war plan OFFTACKLE in late 1949. 
OFFTACKLE also envisioned SAC conducting an atomic air offensive against the Soviet 
Union, and the target planning extended to a wider range of objectives and locations than 
what TROJAN listed.199 OFFTACKLE also required U.S. forces in Europe to occupy a 
defensive front line no farther west than the Rhine river.200 U.S. war planning, therefore, 
oriented U.S. planners towards developing a land force that could defend and fight, 
outnumbered, against the Soviets.  
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 1945-1954:  GERMAN GENERALS, THE “CLEAN WEHRMACHT,” AND 
U.S. ARMY HISTORIANS 
The German Second World War experience swiftly attracted the attention of U.S. 
military thinkers after the end of the Second World War. U.S. Army planners solicited and 
integrated the input of senior German Wehrmacht officers in order to adapt American 
doctrine, such as FM 100–5 (1944 and 1949) which emphasized fixed and positional 
warfare to the requirement to block and delay conventionally superior Soviet forces. 
“Mobile defense” emerged as the doctrinal change in FM 100–5 (1954). The U.S. Army 
subsequently adopted the “Pentomic Division” organizational plan in order to keep pace 
with the emphasis on atomic warfighting increasingly prevalent in U.S. military planning 
circles.  
1. The U.S. Army Historical Division and the Halder Group 
The U.S. Army established the Historical Branch in July 1943 with the assigned 
mission to record the history of Army action in the Second World War.201 U.S. Army 
researchers initially travelled to Europe in 1945 in order to write the story of the Army as 
it unfolded in that theater of operations.202 The Army renamed the Historical Branch as 
the Historical Division, and the Historical Division subsequently formed the Operational 
History (German) Section in order to organize the interviews of hundreds of Wehrmacht 
general officers who were prisoners of war.203 The U.S. Army Historical Division 
appointed General Franz Halder, who served as the chief of the Oberkommando des Heeres 
(OKH) during 1939–1942, and was subsequently relieved by Hitler, arrested in 1944 in the 
wake of the 20 July assassination attempt, and then imprisoned in several concentration 
camps.204  The “Halder Group” generated over 700 reports by early 1949, and the 
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supervisory Foreign Studies Branch within the Historical Division began to plan to release 
the German Report Series.205     
Halder and the German senior officers who worked with the Historical Division did 
so for several reasons. German officers contested the Nuremberg proceedings, which 
occurred during 1946–194 as ill-deserved and in conjunction with West German political 
leadership worked to either reduce or acquit sentences awarded to war criminals such as 
Joachim Peiper, who led the SS troops responsible for executing over one hundred 
American prisoners of war at Malmedy in Belgium during the Ardennes Offensive in 
winter 1944.206   Smelser and Davies state that Halder, throughout the course of his direct 
involvement with the Division and afterward, desired to support the continued fight against 
Bolshevism and “rescue the honor” of the German officer corps and rehabilitate the image 
of the German officer corps in the eyes of the United States.207  
Large segments of the German populace, and allied leaders, associated the self-
defeating militarism of the Wehrmacht with military officers, and German officers formed 
various veteran’s organizations that sought to better the lot of demobilized soldiers and end 
the “defamation” of the former wartime combatants, many of whom were destitute, 
unemployed, and held responsible for the impact of the war in Germany.208 The image of 
 
205 Soutor, “To Stem the Red Tide,” 674. 
206 See Tom Bower, Blind Eye to Murder: Britain, America and the Purging of Nazi Germany 
(London: Granada Publishing, 1983), 118–119 for initial reporting on the Malmedy massacre as it occurred 
during the Ardennes offensive in December 1944 and 412 for notes on domestic German political 
opposition to the execution of Peiper and implications on the discussion revolving around West German 
rearmament; see also Smelser and Davies II, The Myth of the Eastern Front, 55–56 for the transition of 
general U.S. domestic popular and professional military opinion towards either general indifference or 
support to the German officer corps in the wake of the Nuremberg trials and 168-169 for notes on the 
Malmedy massacre and the complicity and trial of Joachim Peiper.  
207 Smelser and Davies II, 65–66, 70–71. 
208 Jay Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1945–1955  (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001) 31 and 34–37 for notes on the 
formation and goals of early veteran’s organizations in postwar Germany, 25 and 27 for details on the anti-
military sentiment present within postwar Germany, 50 for details on the goal to restore the honor of the 
German soldier that was resident in one such organization, the Verband Deutscher Soldaten (VDS), and 
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the German soldier conveyed by Halder and his interviewees aligned with the image 
conveyed by many more demobilized Wehrmacht officers in Germany after Zero Hour: the 
German Wehrmacht, to be distinguished from the Schutzstaffel (SS) death camp guard/ 
Waffen-SS troopers, had kept their honor.209  Such senior Wehrmacht officers such as Erich 
von Manstein and Heinz Guderian reinforced the emerging narrative that the Wehrmacht 
soldiers and leaders had labored under an incompetent and inflexible supreme leader, and 
succumbed to Allied numerical and material superiority only after establishing an 
unparalleled and peerless combat record in the realms of operations and tactics.210   
2. The German Report Series and Historical “Lessons Learned” 
U.S. Army doctrinal development occurred within an evolving strategic and 
political environment distinguished by the increasing imperative to defend European allies 
against the conventionally superior Soviet threat and rising profile of the air-delivered U.S. 
nuclear arsenal within the U.S. military. The German experience on the Eastern Front, 
therefore, seemed to provide historical lessons tailored to the very situation at hand, and 
lent Army planners some historical justification for advocating the importance of their 
service role within the requirement to defend Europe.211 German Report Series pamphlets 
such as DA PAM 20-230, Russian Combat Methods in World War II, DA PAM 20-269, 
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Small Unit Actions during the German Campaign in Russia, and DA PAM 20-233, German 
Defense Tactics against Russian Breakthroughs, transmitted the German version of the 
Eastern Front to a receptive audience within the U.S. military, who subsequently discussed 
the content of these pamphlets within professional journals and the military educational 
establishment.212   
These pamphlets captured the essence and innate contradictions of the German 
response to defeat on the Eastern Front. The paradox communicated in these manuals was 
thus: the Wehrmacht succumbed, eventually, in a premodern and almost primeval 
environment under the sheer mass of the Red Army, which somehow blended military 
cunning and improvisation with the subhuman qualities of its indoctrinated foot 
soldiers.213 The Russian soldier struggled to cope with unexpected changes in his 
environment, and yet managed to execute unorthodox tank tactics and infiltrate German 
positions with relative ease.214 The Wehrmacht did, however, employ mobile defense 
tactics and frequent counterattacks in the defense to delay and attrit the Red Army as the 
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German line collapsed in the wake of the Stalingrad debacle and ensuing Red Army 
operational and strategic offensive in the years 1943-1945.215  
3. The Year 1953: The German Generals Review U.S Army FM 100–5  
It is this defensive experience at the tactical and operational level that most 
interested U.S. Army planners in the context of the imperative to defend Europe in 1949 
from something other than an offshore air and maritime strategy with no continental 
commitment. Once NATO was founded, this imperative of forward defense grew steadily 
more urgent. The capstone U.S. Army field tactical manual, FM 100–5, mandated that U.S. 
Army units retain fortified defensive positions capable of mutually supporting each other 
“at all costs” and be prepared to focus artillery fire on a “main line of resistance”.216 Which 
at the time was rather close to the Atlantic Coast, and entailed abandoning much of Europe 
to the Red Army. The U.S. Army submitted the 1949 version of the capstone U.S. Army 
doctrinal operations publication, FM 100–5, to a select group of German military 
leaders.217 This study group produced MS #P-133: “Analysis of U.S. Field Service 
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Regulations.” MS #P-133, published in 1953, critiqued the formulaic approach that FM 
100–5 (1949) took towards battle leadership, challenged the rigid nature of U.S. defensive 
doctrine that discounted defensive combat as a purely in-extremis mode of warfare and 
corresponding requirement for a “main line of resistance” to be held “at all costs,” and also 
questioned the inattentiveness towards armor employment resident throughout the 
manual.218  
This critique informed the approach the Army took towards FM 100–5. “Mobile 
defense” (a term borrowed from the Weimar Republic Reichswehr and used by the 
Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front) entered the Army lexicon within the version of FM 100–
5 released in 1954, and channeled some of the input of the German review group and the 
output of the Halder Group.219 Per FM 100–5 (1954), mobile defense consisted of 
establishing lightly manned forward defensive positions tasked to provide early warning 
of any impending attack, canalize the opponent into undesirable terrain, and ideally block 
the enemy in order to allow a reserve “striking force” to maneuver on and destroy the 
attacking force.220   
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4. The Year 1956: The Pentomic Era Begins and the End of Mobile 
Defense 
Smelser and Davies observe that the high financial cost of the armored force needed 
to support the new mobile defense doctrine and the new requirements of atomic warfighting 
planning precluded the application of mobile defense doctrine to actual Army force 
structure changes.221 Senior U.S. Army leaders in the early 1950s increasingly believed 
that tactical atomic weaponry, i.e., heavy artillery and battlefield missiles, rendered the 
standard Army infantry division tactical triangular organization obsolete, and that armored 
units as organized were the only U.S. Army units capable of surviving on any future 
European battlefield.222 This change occurred within the broader context of President 
Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy, which prioritized the expansion of the U.S. fission and 
fusion bomb arsenal as a cost-effective measure of assuring national defense that directed 
funding towards the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command in particular, and away from 
the U.S. Army amid much civil-military friction and problems of alliance cohesion.223     
General Matthew Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff from 1953–1955, assailed the 
“New Look” approach as fundamentally flawed and called on the U.S. National Security 
Council to “reject emphatically any policy of preventive war” as “devoid of moral 
principle.”224 Nevertheless, the Eisenhower administration carried out the “New Look” 
policy, and the Army reluctantly adapted and became politicized. Army planners believed 
that combat formations needed to be able to be highly mobile in order to quickly disperse 
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on the atomic battlefield.225  General Maxwell Taylor, the next Chief of Staff of the Army, 
introduced the highly air mobile and smaller brigade-structured “Pentomic Division” 
concept to the public in 1956 after a series of Army practice maneuvers in Europe and the 
United States that sought to confront the tactical and operational use of nuclear weapons 
then coming into widespread use on both sides.226 The Pentomic Division organizational 
structure, so named due to the subdivision of all “battle group” echelons into successive 
groupings of five units, endured until President Kennedy introduced his “Flexible 
Response” strategy that mandated the Army prepare to fight guerillas in revolutionary wars 
outside of Europe and also led to the so-called Reorganization Objectives Army Division 
(ROAD) structure in the early 1960s.227  
 1973-1982:  THE ERA OF ACTIVE DEFENSE AND AIRLAND BATTLE 
In the wake of the October 1973 war and the end of the Indochina war in 1975, the 
Army reoriented on the European defense mission, and specifically examined how to best 
employ mechanized units to support that mission.228 The defense of Germany, and 
strategic-political requirement to cede as little West German terrain as possible to the 
Warsaw Pact, lent momentum to the “active defense” doctrinal concept as enshrined in FM 
100–5 (1976).229 The commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrinal Command 
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(TRADOC), General William DePuy, especially looked to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war as a 
source for “lessons learned” applicable to the European front.230 DePuy was a Second 
World War combat veteran who appreciated the tactical acumen of his German wartime 
opponents and believed that U.S. air and artillery fires lent the Army the “margin of 
superiority in overall combat power” in that conflict.231  He elected, in 1974, to employ 
TRADOC to re-write all Army field manuals in order to transmit the lessons of the 1973 
war and the methods best suited to meet European land defense requirements.232 
1. General DePuy, TRADOC, the Bundeswehr, and FM 100–5 
General DePuy maintained a professional interest in the German approach to 
fighting, and the organization of Bundeswehr units and their approach to fighting and 
defensive operations shaped his approach towards FM 100–5. DePuy visited Germany in 
1974 and learned about how the West Germans employed Panzergrenadier units, for 
instance.233 DePuy admired these formations, which were the successors of the 
mechanized infantry that accompanied wartime Wehrmacht panzers into combat. The 
modern Panzergrenadier units employed infantry fighting vehicles in order to better 
protect and move mounted infantry soldiers around the modern battlefield.234 DePuy 
intended to realign U.S. Army doctrine to capture what he perceived to be the German 
emphasis on armored mobility and “forward defense” as close to the contested East-West 
border as possible. DePuy established and maintained personal relationships with senior 
members of the West German Bundeswehr, supported a series of annual U.S-German 
meetings that revolved around military doctrine, training, and equipment.235 General 
DePuy informed the Army Chief of Staff, General Weyand, as such in 1975: “TRADOC, 
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in conjunction with FORSCOM, is now changing our doctrine (tactics and techniques) to 
conform with the German. Basically, we are involved in moving from a ‘Dismounted 
Infantry’ oriented doctrine to an ‘Armored’ doctrine with the Infantry, Artillery, and Air 
Defense in support…”.236 
Army officers tasked to update FM 100–5 took the cue and reviewed translated 
copies of the German doctrinal publication HDv 100/100, which was published in 
September 1973.237 HDv 100/100 emphasized repelling any enemy offensive as far 
forward as possible and directed commanders to be prepared to rapidly shift their focus of 
effort, assume risk in some defensive sectors in order to mass in others, and deploy mobile 
counterattacks as needed.238 General DePuy travelled to Germany in 1975, briefed senior 
German officers on the new draft of FM 100–5, and returned satisfied that the two 
publications—the draft version of FM 100–5 and the published HDv 100/100—detailed 
the same defensive principles. TRADOC had been communicating directly with German 
army leadership, and Herbert contends that General DePuy leveraged these professional 
relationships and the impression that U.S. Army doctrine was evolving to mirror German 
operational requirements in order to legitimize the draft version of FM 100–5.239   
The Army published the revised version of FM 100–5 in 1976. FM 100–5 (1976) 
identified war in Europe as the “most demanding mission” for the Army and aligned the 
content of the manual primarily towards how Army forces should fight in that scenario 
with the admonition that, if so tasked, Army units should be prepared to operate 
elsewhere.240 FM 100–5 explicitly outlined “how to fight” over the course of the said 
named third chapter, and identified four key “prerequisites” to be satisfied in order to win 
in combat: 1) sufficient levels of forces and weapons should be concentrated at the correct 
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places; 2) fighting must be “controlled and directed” in order to focus the effect of fires 
and maneuver; 3) Army units should employ “cover, concealment, suppression, and 
combined arms teamwork” in order to “maximize the effectiveness of our weapons,” and 
4) weapon and vehicle teams and crews “must be trained to use the maximum capabilities 
of their weapons.”241  Chapter 5, “Defense” identified five “fundamentals of the defense,” 
and directed units in the defense to mass forces and fires at Soviet breakthrough points 
along the “Forward Edge of the Battle Area” (FEBA).242  Chapter 5 proscribed defensive 
tactics down to the level of anti-tank guided missile crew emplacement guidance and 
company-level engagement criteria, and also tasked tank commanders to position “hull 
down” whenever possible.243 
General DePuy argued that military doctrine “very clearly is based around weapon 
systems…it says that you study the weapons, yours and the enemy’s (sic), and then you 
look for ways of optimizing the employment of your new weapons and minimizing your 
vulnerability” during a post-career interview with the U.S. Military History institute in 
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Carlisle, Pennsylvania.244 Critics, however, argued that FM 100–5 (1976) valued the 
technical and excessively rigid application of firepower over initiative and maneuver, 
relied on weapon systems that were not fully fielded, and did not address how to counter 
follow-on Soviet counterattacks.245 General Edward Meyer served as the Army Chief of 
Staff during 1979–1983, and believed that FM 100–5 (1976) oriented excessively on 
European war, believed that Army doctrine should address a broader spectrum of possible 
missions, and observed that the ability of Army officers to exercise military judgment was 
eroding under the requirement to adhere to more scripted doctrinal principles like that in 
FM 100–5 (1976).246 General Donn Starry, who commanded V Corps in West Germany 
in 1976, observed that units attempting to employ the active defense doctrine in field 
exercises were frequently “destroyed” by successive follow-on echelons of simulated 
enemy forces – V Corps, it seemed, could fight for six days at most and would sustain fifty 
percent casualties.247   
2. 1977-1982: The Revision of FM 100–5, the Return of Maneuver, and 
the Introduction of AirLand Battle 
General Starry returned to the United States in 1977 after commanding V Corps in 
West Germany, assumed command of TRADOC, and directed TRADOC and members of 
the Command and General Staff College to revise FM 100–5 (1976).248 FM 100–5 (1982) 
detailed “AirLand Battle” doctrine and differed substantially, in tone and content, from FM 
100–5 (1976).249 Taking more than a page from the German record, AirLand Battle 
emphasized “indirect approaches,” the initiative of lower-echelon commanders, planning 
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within the operational level of war, and “deep attack” to support defensive operations.250 
The manual described successful defensive operations as consisting of a “shield of blows,” 
and stated that “Offensive combat is as much a part of defensive operations as strongpoint 
defenses or delaying defenses.”251 This marked a clear departure from the previous field 
manual, and aimed to enable U.S. forces to counter follow-on Soviet echelons via 
maneuvering to positions of advantage and not merely lying in wait, per the “active 
defense” model.252     
The manual also explicitly cites the fact that “US, German, and Israeli campaign 
plans have historically made use of long-range interdiction to gain local battlefield 
advantages.”253 FM 100–5 (1982) defined the “dynamics of battle” prior to addressing 
offensive and defensive operations in order to establish that “intangible factors” such as 
“leader skill, firmness of purpose, and boldness” often supersede more tangible aspects of 
fighting – force ratios and firepower effect, for example – to decide the outcome of 
combat.254 FM 100–5 also directed commanders to issue “mission orders” that avoided 
overly proscribing subordinate courses of action in order to allow room for subordinate 
initiative in combat.255  
 WEHRMACHT SCHOLARSHIP AND THE MYTH AND REALITY OF 
GERMAN WARFARE  
1. AirLand Battle and the German Generals in Northern Virginia 
U.S. Army officers continued to solicit Wehrmacht officers for advice regarding 
Cold War military challenges into the 1980s, when Army doctrinal developers introduced 
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“AirLand Battle” as a warfighting concept. Academic scholarship and U.S. military 
professional discourse also oriented on German wartime history in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Academics profiled the historical German General Staff as possessing a “genius for war,” 
and cited the developmental history of the First World War German stosstrupp as the 
record of an ideal type of organization which decentralized leadership and capability to the 
lowest tactical level in order to overcome the severe operational restrictions on maneuver 
which existed on the Western Front. Other scholars looked to the Second World War 
German raids in 1940 Eban Emael and in support of the Mussolini rescue in 1943 and 
concluded that the Germans had, indeed, mastered military tactics. This approach, 
collectively, orients almost exclusively on the military record of German arms as 
manifested in battles won and narrowly lost, idealized staff planning structures, and 
“lessons learned” as applicable towards U.S. military effectiveness in battle at the tactical 
and operational level. 
General DePuy, after his retirement, invited two former Wehrmacht commanders 
to participate in a wargame held in northern Virginia in 1980 in order to “develop relevant, 
transferable insights, appropriate for application in contemporary and future tactical 
situations, based on the extensive experience of two veteran German general officers who 
came to know the Russians as few living persons have.”256 The BDM Corporation, based 
out of northern Virginia, convened the war game in May 1980, and hosted two Wehrmacht 
officers: Generals Balck and Mellenthin. General Hermann Balck was the commander of 
the Sixth German Army at the end of the Second World War, and General Mellenthin was 
serving as the Chief of Staff within the Fifth Panzer Army at that time. Both men had served 
together in Russia, and General Mellenthin had operated as General Balck’s Chief of Staff 
during the Russian campaign.257  
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The German generals participated in a war game exercise along with several other 
senior U.S. Army commanders, and the scenario involved the U.S. Army V Corps Third 
Armored Division and the defense of West Germany.258 American representatives 
explained that the Third Division mission was to defend as far forward as possible in the 
Hunfeld-Lauterbach-Bad Hersfeld area, in keeping with U.S. “active defense” doctrine.259 
General Balck conferred with his former chief of staff, and they quickly briefed their plan. 
The Germans intended to allow Soviet forces to advance past the forward defensive lines 
and then attack, which was in keeping with how they had traded space for time on the 
Eastern Front.260 The dictum “Schlagen aus der Nachhand”, or “strike from the backhand”, 
best captures how experienced German commanders such as Manstein conceptualized the 
art and practice of counterattacking under pressure.261 The Germans advised that, based off 
their prior wartime experiences, Russian forces were best disoriented by attack from the 
flank, and that “the Russians were peculiarly susceptible to disorganization when 
confronted with new and unexpected situations.”262 The Germans also expounded on their 
thoughts on the proper positioning and actions of commanders, Auftragstaktik, the 
Schwerpunckt, and how the “moral power of the commander” was best leveraged at critical 
points in combat.263 No voice, it seems, challenged Mellenthin’s assertion as typical of a 
man of his time even in the 1980s that Russians “are masses and we are individuals…the 
difference between the Russian soldier and the European soldier.”264 
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2. Maneuver Warfare, Fighting Power, and Special Operations 
Schwerpunckt appeared again in William Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 
defined as the “focus of effort” and “where the commander can believe he can achieve a 
decision.”265 Lind informed the U.S. Marine Corps “maneuver warfare” intellectual 
movement by extracting and transmitting vignettes and excerpts drawn from English-
language study of Wehrmacht fighting prowess, to include Martin van Creveld’s Fighting 
Power (1982). The Maneuver Warfare Handbook extolls the virtues of decentralized 
leadership and command and control via “mission type orders,” “trust tactics,” the value 
of thinking “two levels up,” and understanding how to assess enemy strengths and “gaps” 
in order to plan successfully.266  
Lind also cites Martin van Creveld’s Fighting Power as “must reading” if the reader 
“is to understand how everything a military service is and does must follow from maneuver 
doctrine if it is to be capable of maneuver warfare in combat.”267 Van Creveld assessed 
battle and casualty statistics from various Second World War engagements between the 
German armed forces and Allied units, observed that German units continually inflicted 
more casualties than they sustained despite nearly continuous reversals later in the war, 
and argued that the internal organization and structure of the Second World War German 
Wehrmacht enabled that organization to outfight all enemies in that conflict.268 As Van 
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Creveld states: “The German Army was a superb fighting organization. In point of morale, 
elan, unit cohesion, and resilience, it probably had no equal among twentieth century 
armies.”269 Van Creveld discounts national character and ideology as a causal variable 
with regard to the disparity in U.S. and German wartime performance statistics and 
concludes that German organizational principles that reduced administrative burden, 
command principles that encouraged individual initiative, personnel management 
practices, and officer education practices that prioritized individual character over tested 
intelligence established the conditions that supported German battlefield success.270 
Several German small-unit level raids have also attracted academic attention. 
Gudmundsson prefaces Stormtroop Tactics with a brief vignette of the successful German 
glider raid against the Belgian Eban Emael fortress in 1940 prior to the main assault of the 
1940 campaign against Belgium and France.271 McRaven integrates the Eban Emael raid 
into his survey of various small-unit missions in Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special 
Operations Warfare, and also outlines the planning and execution of the German 
Fallschirmjaeger mission that retrieved Benito Mussolini from captivity in 1943.272 
McRaven provides strategic and political context for the mission: the Allied landings in 
southern Italy in early 1943 and subsequent northern advances prompted the downfall of 
Mussolini and his imprisonment by the Italian Carabinieri. Therefore, Hitler himself tasked 
one of the “best commando leaders” in Germany to rescue the imprisoned leader.273 
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McRaven focuses on the role of the Austrian SS officer, Otto Skorzeny, and his special unit 
that was “the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led commando outfit in the German 
armed forces.”274 The Spec Ops account of the mission assigns Skorzeny a leading role in 
the mission during both mission planning and execution, and deems the mission itself as a 
success because it demonstrated the capabilities and tactical acumen of the German armed 
forces, asserted the willingness of Nazi Germany to support allies under pressure, and also 
supported German propaganda needs.275  
Recent critical scholarship casts doubt on the scope of control and importance that 
Skorzeny occupied within the Mussolini rescue mission. The German paratrooper and 
Naval Postgraduate School graduate Andreas Handschuh, for instance, analyzes the 
historical record of the raid, Allied postwar observation of Skorzeny, and the political-
strategic situation of Germany in mid-1943 and concludes that Skorzeny substantially 
exaggerated his own role in the mission.276 Handschuh concludes that Skorzeny served in 
a support role prior to and during the mission and lacked the leadership traits and training 
required to assume a leading role.277 Therefore, Handschuh asserts, it is unlikely that 
Skorzeny, as a SS combat support officer, would have operated independently from or been 
in charge of the German Fallschirmjaeger/airborne troops that participated in the 
mission.278 The Skorzeny myth did support German propaganda objectives aimed at 
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inspiring the German population when the German war effort was under considerable 
pressure on the Eastern Front, and also to the south in Italy.279     
3. Critical Scholarship and the Myth and Reality of German Warfare 
The record of the Wehrmacht has also attracted scholarly attention within academia. 
Some observers cast the record of modern German arms as evidence to support the thesis 
that the Wehrmacht was an ideal type of military organization,  and suggest that the German 
General Staff exhibited a “genius for war” as manifested in “combat superiority” and 
favorable casualty ratios, initiative at all levels of command, and the institutionalization of 
“military excellence.”.280 Gerhard Gross traces the historical continuity between different 
eras of German operational planning and concludes that the reality of the self-defeating 
record of German arms in Europe serves to counter the myth that German arms represents 
an ideal type of warfare. Timothy Glantz and Richard Overy illuminate how the Soviet war 
effort adapted to and eventually triumphed on the Eastern Front and how the history of the 
Red Army confounds the dismissive approach resident within myths of the Eastern Front. 
Mark Mazower also examines the inner workings of the National Socialist occupation in 
Central Europe, and illuminates the savage and ultimately self-defeating nature of 
racialized National Socialist wartime policies and how the racialized neo-colonial 
imaginings of Nazis such as Himmler metastasized and came into being under wartime 
pressure. 
Gerhard Gross’s The Myth and Reality of German Warfare considers the record of 
German arms in the Second World War and concludes that German operational thought as 
represented by the actions and plans of the OKH and Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 
(OKW) was unsustainable, ill-considered, and self-defeating.281 German operational 
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thought and war planning oriented on waging short campaigns via the decisive battles of 
annihilation in order to compensate for Germany’s exposed geographic position and 
historical shortfalls in resources and manpower.282 Gross concludes that the German 
victories in Poland and France in 1939 and 1940 were not so much the result of long-term 
strategy as they were grounded in immediate operational planning, the exploitation of 
adversary mistakes, and the local initiative within the mobile panzer formations that 
continued to press the attack.283  
Gross also highlights the fact that Hitler and the German military command were 
frequently at odds over the end goal of Eastern Front operations – namely, that Hitler 
desired to secure raw materials and the industrial base needed to sustain the war effort, and 
that the German high command typically oriented on attacking and destroying Russian 
forces in the field in the classical model.284 Moreover, Gross emphasizes the fact that the 
Germans continually underrated the logistical and operational challenges of war in Russia, 
and indeed maintained a force that, for all the emphasis on panzer formations, remained 
largely either foot-mobile or partially motorized and relied on a thin “crust” of fully 
motorized armored formations.285 Gross concludes that the German approach to war 
planning and war fighting that considered “warfare in a vacuum”286 and emphasized rapid 
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movement, decisive battle against enemy formations, and deemphasized logistics was 
really “a military attempt to solve the strategic dilemma” that, historically, Germany had 
operated in since the time of Moltke.287  
Smelser and Davies observe that one aspect of the “Myth of the Eastern Front” as 
transmitted by German officers after the Second World War adopts the Nazi racialized 
image of the Soviet solder that generally denigrates the Russian victory as won through 
mass and brute endurance.288 The noted scholars of the Soviet and German armies  
Timothy Glantz and Richard Overy discredit this approach via their accounts of the story 
of Russian arms on the Eastern Front. Glantz and House observe that the historical record 
of Soviet wartime innovation effectively counters the “myth” that Hitler’s interference, 
Russian terrain and winter conditions, and Soviet materiel superiority and U.S. Lend-Lease 
aid sealed the fate of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.289  
Glantz and House observe that the Red Army dramatically reinvented itself in 
1942–1943 and developed fighting tactics and operational practices that lent it a decisive 
advantage over German forces.290 The Soviets employed mobile maneuver groups in order 
to conduct reconnaissance, employ fires, bypass German defenders, seize critical terrain, 
and encircle and reduce isolated German forces during their great transition to offensive 
operations in 1943.291 Additionally, Overy observes that Soviet leadership directed the 
wholesale displacement and transport of much of the Russian heavy industrial base away 
from the German offensive in 1942 into areas east of the Ural mountains.292 Overy also 
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observes that Russian engineers and soldiers developed capable tanks, aircraft, and heavy 
artillery on their own.293 The principle contribution of Lend Lease, Overy observes, was 
to augment Russian logistical capabilities with trucks and enhance Russian 
communications capabilities with U.S. field radios.294 
The body of military thought and historical scholarship that lauds and transmits the 
story of German arms and Wehrmacht tactical-operational success weights popular and 
military discourse to consider, specifically, the Wehrmacht as an ideal type of military 
organization unique in time and space and disconnected from the Nazi party state. 
Mazower’s Hitler’s Empire lends moral context to any effort made towards understanding 
the impact of German arms in Europe during the Second World War. Mazower observes 
that Hitler’s racial philosophy established, animated, and guided the German strategy that 
reduced both occupied states and allies as de facto vassals who served to satisfy German 
economic need and desire for lebensraum.295  
Mazower explains that the emergence of the Nazi Gauleiter, the progressive 
erosion of the rule of any sort of law within both Germany and the physical annihilation 
and legalistic exclusion of the occupied peoples of Central Europe, were all part of the 
centralization of rule of captured territories and extension of National Socialist Party-
affiliated rulers throughout the occupied territories.296 Nazi occupation unfolded in a 
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disordered fashion, and the SS, Army, and National Socialist party initially had overlapping 
spheres of influence that gradually saw the SS exert increasing influence within the police 
and security apparatus.297 The intense combat on the Eastern Front catalyzed the move 
towards the “Final Solution,” which the Wehrmacht directly and indirectly supported.298 
The inescapable conclusion is that the Wehrmacht served a racist imperialist nation-state 
that pursued generalized plunder, murder, and imperial dominion on an unparalleled scale 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the cult of “American exceptionalism” and the record of the U.S. as the 
world’s military hegemon since 2003, this thesis has examined the idea: “How has 
European military history, military thought, and military myth shaped U.S. military 
thought?” The answer has surveyed the course of U.S. defense strategy as it has related to 
Europe, and specifically how it has engaged with the record of German military history, 
thought, and myth as channeled via the writings, interpretations, and misinterpretations of 
Carl von Clausewitz and the historical record of the Wehrmacht in the mirror of U.S. 
military doctrine in the 20th century. This thesis seeks to make clear that military thought 
and doctrine are manifestly an international process of challenge and response. The 
workings of this dialectical system recommend themselves to such a young person as this 
author who embark on a career in this undertaking and who, as a rule, need professional 
preparation to do so. This work is offered with this thought in mind. 
To be sure, the influence of the world of ideas on the world in which we live is a 
difficult thing to identify, explain, and isolate. Paret observes the following with regard to 
the study of Clausewitz and his influence in which the prescriptive dogma is counterposted 
to its analytical and dialectically focused opposite, all ensnarled in the cult of “lessons 
learned”: 
The influence of a theorist whose intentions in his major work are not 
prescriptive is perhaps especially difficult to determine. It is not surprising 
that the search for Clausewitz’s influence, which began in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, has been confused and inconclusive. That one or 
two sentences from On War have entered common usage, or that some of 
its arguments have been misinterpreted to support the military fashions of 
the day, scarcely proves that his ideas have had a genuine impact. On the 
contrary, if we examine the conduct of war since Clausewitz wrote, we will 
find little evidence that scholars and governments have made use of his 
theories. Wars have repeatedly demonstrated the relevance of Clausewitz’s 
theories, but nothing has proved more elusive to discover than the 
application of “lessons” learned from On War.299 
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The present work has illuminated several enduring themes related to how the 
doctrine establishment in the U.S. military has engaged with the history of war in Europe, 
and correspondingly how the record of European war and associated thought, history, and 
myth has influenced the U.S. military approach to war and strategy. The evidence for this 
generalization is to be found in documents of fighting doctrine and discourse surrounding 
Clausewitz and, especially, the Wehrmacht as communicated within U.S. military 
institutions and Western academic and popular historical work in the 20th century amid 
the epoch of total war.  
 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
First, Americans very often have looked to the record of European war in order to 
extract ready-made tactical and operational practices seemingly suited to immediate 
military challenges. The U.S. Army, facing a deteriorating political and security situation 
in Europe in early years of the Cold War, turned to captive German generals for answers, 
as the defensive mission in Europe seemingly mirrored that experienced by the Wehrmacht 
on the Eastern Front from 1943 onward. Critical scholarship indicates that, while U.S. 
Army historians and their receptive commanders believed they were gaining valuable 
“lessons learned” from their captive and cooperative German generals, their captives had 
their own agenda that very much derived from the domestic political, social, and economic 
state of postwar Germany and the demobilized Wehrmacht officer corps.  
These generals transmitted a perspective on the Russian foe that was inherently 
paradoxical—the individual Russian soldier as essentially subhuman and easily disoriented 
by the unexpected, the Russian higher command and industrial base clearly capable of 
conducting large-scale and dynamic operations with highly capable tanks and artillery—
and well received by U.S. officers eager to learn how to fight the Soviets. One can 
appreciate the problems associated with any military thought and doctrine that is founded 
on the conception of an enemy that cannot innovate and adapt; indeed, this generalization, 
in the end, did not really apply to the Soviets on the strategic level. U.S. Army planners 
would transition to the Pentomic Division concept in the mid-1950s, struggle through the 
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morass of Vietnam and attendant confusion on how to best combat revolutionary war, and 
return to focus on land warfare in Europe in the mid-1970s.  
With the Warsaw Pact build up in the 1970s in mind, the setbacks of Israeli arms 
against a Soviet style Kursk defense with the new weapons of anti-access and area denial 
in the 1973 Yom Kippur war catalyzed U.S. Army doctrinal revision and development in 
the mid-1970s. The newly founded U.S. Army TRADOC (a “lesson” of Vietnam)  looked 
to Germany of the Third Reich and to the Federal Republic of Germany with its 
Bundeswehr for both inspiration on how to best counter Soviet conventional superiority 
and how to best align with West German strategy that prioritized keeping land warfare as 
close to the East-West border as possible. TRADOC adopted the “active defense” approach 
within FM 100–5 in 1976. Real combat never tested this “active defense”; however, the 
doctrine generated to meet the requirements of European war afforded little perspective on 
forms of battle and war not immediately tied to the expected clash on NATO’s Central 
Front. Critical voices in the U.S. Army charged that, as it stood, the doctrine neglected the 
more intangible and moral elements of war that were much on military minds in the uproar 
of the 1970s, was excessively prescriptive, and rendered forces ill-equipped to manage a 
Soviet enemy that might ration reserve maneuver elements and avoid positioning the 
majority of forces within the planned defensive engagement areas as the Israelis had 
learned to their dismay in October 1973 when they were nearly defeated, as opposed to the 
operational success won in June 1967. 
Second, U.S. military thought as represented in service doctrine, professional 
military education curricula material, and reflection on U.S. strategic problems has 
transferred decontextualized concepts from On War, such as the “center of gravity”, into 
military doctrine and defense-intellectual discourse. The scholar Beyerchen acknowledges 
the appeal of such approaches: “Practicing soldiers may warm to the idea of focusing one’s 
efforts on the most critical concentration of the enemy’s fighting forces in order to strike 
the most telling blow.”300 This echoes the Jominian precept to “operate a combined effort 
 
300 Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International 
Security 17, no. 3 (1992), 84, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539130. 
82 
with a strong mass upon a single point,”301 and illustrates how the reductionistic and 
extractive approach toward Clausewitz may lead the reader to draw ill-informed 
conclusions regarding such concepts as the “center of gravity.” 
However, as Beyerchen proceeds to argue, Clausewitz qualifies his approach 
toward the center of gravity with a number of additional circumstances under which the 
center of gravity might be a city, or “community of interest” amongst wartime partners, or 
perhaps even popular sentiment or the personality of a leader.302  Contrary to the 
interpretation of John Boyd, for example, the “most Newtonian-sounding analogy of a 
‘center of gravity’ becomes swamped in qualifications and caveats intended to convey the 
complexity of real war.”303 
The thesis does not take issue with inclusion of Clausewitzian terms and phrases 
within U.S. doctrine and military educational material as it stands. This thesis does, 
however, posit that the historic and contextual approach, i.e., to have a thorough 
understanding of the scholarly method and context in the 18th and 19th century, best 
exemplified within the work of Peter Paret merits much more attention within U.S. military 
discourse. Paret observes the following with regard to Clausewitz’s thoughts and writings: 
Finally, can we penetrate far into his writings without knowing something 
about the author and his world?  The bare structure of his theories stands on 
its own, but how much is obscured or becomes meaningless when he is read 
as though he were a late-20th-century defense analyst who chooses to think 
and express himself in a peculiar manner. In turn, any interpretation of his 
political and military actions, to say nothing of his personal development, 
is pointless unless Clausewitz’s writings are brought to bear on his life.304    
Finally, U.S. military thought should also see such popular writings on doctrine 
with the school of thought put forth by writers such as Martin van Creveld, John Keegan, 
J. F. C. Fuller, and Basil Liddell Hart in the rigors of their own time, their own biographies 
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(i.e., the British Army in 1918, or the Israeli Army in 1973) and their own place in the 
history of ideas about war, the character of strategy, the levels of war, and the means of 
securing victory. These thinkers, while outside the immediate circle of U.S. military 
thought as represented within American strategic discourse and U.S. military doctrinal 
development, are nonetheless important because they are visible contributors to the wider 
realm of ideas within which U.S. military thought exists. They are persons of merit, but 
such merit often does not include a real reading of Clausewitz in its detail or an accurate 
depiction of German military thought, or the impact of German military thought on the 
wider world. One has always to keep in mind the subjective codex of an author and his or 
her time, and his or her readership, to include the commercial aspect, which is sizeable in 
the world of book selling and domination of “discourse”.  
In this case, a fine example is the 1991 work by Martin Van Creveld. Van Creveld’s 
The Transformation of War, for instance, earned a back-cover laudatory review from 
Marine Corps “maneuverist” advocate Colonel Mike Wyly, and John Keegan’s Face of 
Battle and Mask of Command retain word-of-mouth recognition amongst officers serious 
about military history. The author of this thesis read J. F. C. Fuller’s Conduct of War as 
part of a discussion group hosted at the Marine Corp’s officer training school, and Basil 
Liddell Hart’s iconoclastic stature and from-the-trenches pathos vis a vis the “Madhi of 
Mass” critique surely must echo especially with those officers who have experienced the 
bad end of a losing strategy and failed policy. No one need apologize for these facts that 
show the manner in which tactics is often mistaken for strategy and the highly didactic and 
lessons learned dogma that is at the center of US military education and training. 
Nonetheless, this school of thought has woven logical fallacy into the body of 
Clausewitzian studies in the English-speaking world for reasons of cultural or national bias 
as well as a school of “lessons learned” and a picking and choosing from the past  that may 
or may not constitute a work of history that can stand scrutiny. This cult of damning 
Prussian military thought as being somehow an extension of Hitler’s world (a topic also 
examined here) avoids considering the full scope of what Clausewitz wrote on politics, 
strategy, the observed nature of combat, psychology, and organized violence. Once more, 
the British experience of total war and German arms in 1914-1918 and 1940-1945 in the 
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case of such men as Liddell Hart and Keegan’s connection of the horrors of industrialized 
total war to Clausewitzian strategy assumes nearly ad hominem proportions as an 
argument, and disregards the possibility that a Clausewitzian lens of analysis, as applied to 
the First World War by such fine scholars as Michael Howard and Hew Strachan, might 
indeed reveal important truths regarding the complex interplay of the nature of war, the 
mobilization of popular passion and anger, the stalemate on the Western Front, the inherent 
strength of the defense, and the impact of ill-considered policy on war. Van Creveld’s 
approach selectively extracts portions of Clausewitz’s initial argument about the nature of 
war, policy, and the “first trinity” and essentially builds a straw-man version of the 
Prussian’s thought that casts the “Clausewitzian Universe” as a post-1648 environment 
bounded by the false dictum that war serves policy and is unconnected with the actual 
politics of the society in question.  
The Transformation of War avoids substantive discussion of the true trinity of 
violence and anger, chance, and politics; doubtlessly because to do so would undermine 
the thesis that Clausewitzian thought is inapplicable to the world of 1991. Also, the author 
is guilty of suggesting that the Israeli and Middle East experience of war since, say, 1948 
onwards, is the dominant experience of war at all times and place. All the same, the 1991 
book appeared exactly at the right moment and right place to find a huge following in the 
U.S. that as of 1991 became the dominant power in the Middle East and, at the same time, 
ensnarled for a generation in the warfare native to the place. Just as the German ally in the 
Cold War shaped U.S. perceptions of war, strategy, operations and so forth, the school of 
Van Creveld and the primacy of irregular war and the ideal of militarized state and society 
at war, itself a variant of Ludendorff’s First World War vision, has become generalized in 
part with the aid of Van Creveld’s work. His later attitude about gender and society as well 
as about the profession of arms have surely not improved his reputation as a scholar.305 
 
305 See, for example, Martin Van Creveld, “To Wreck a Military,” Small Wars Journal, January 28, 
2013, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/to-wreck-a-military. See also Martin van Creveld, “The Great 
Illusion: Women in the Military,” Millennium 29, no. 2 (2000): 429–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290021101. 
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 A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON “MODERN” EUROPEAN WARFARE   
Americans have for centuries looked to war in Europe for handy historical lessons, 
inspiration, and to understand what future battle might look like. As mentioned above, the 
rise of COIN doctrine in the past generation, if not in the epoch of the 1950s and 1960s, 
has also figured into this discourse in the recent history of U.S. strategy and war. In this 
effort, critical approaches have examined the historical record of European 
counterrevolutionary warfare in cases such as the British and French experience from the 
19th century until the end of their empires in the 1960s. Critical scholarship reveals some 
of Michael Howard’s “disagreeable facts” regarding the gap between COIN “as advertised” 
and the actual record of European militaries. The real story of the fighting in Algeria, 
Malaya, Africa, elsewhere in Asia, and even South America suggest that the factors that 
generated perceived strategic or operational victory in these areas were linked to little-
acknowledged violent tactics incongruent with the popular image of COIN as the supreme 
method to wage war.  
With the setbacks manifest in the post September 11th campaign clearly evident in 
2004-2005 in Iraq, U.S. COIN planners looked to the history of European colonial warfare 
in order to frame thought about the deteriorating situation in Iraq. The U.S. Army and U.S. 
Marine Corps released Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in 2006.306  FM 3-24 
identified, or perhaps not, the celebrated actions of former times adapted to the 21st century  
needed to wage successful counterinsurgency: “stability operations”, provision of “civil 
security” and “civil control,” the provision of essential services to the populace, support to 
economic and infrastructure development, and offensive and defensive operations 
considered more typical to how militaries train, deploy, and fight.307  FM 3-24 directly 
cites European counterinsurgency thought, for example the dictum initially posed by 
French counterinsurgency specialist David Galula regarding population support for an 
 
306 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, December 2006,) https://permanent.fdlp.gov/lps79762/FM_3-24.pdf.  
307 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency,  1–19 to 1–20. 
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insurgency:  “In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the 
cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.”308 
What with some perspective of at best limited political success and much failure, 
scholarship critical toward the development of FM 3-24 contends that manual and, indeed, 
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine more broadly ignore the foundation of European success 
in foreign colonial wars, such as the British campaign in Malaya. Scholarship contends that 
the vision of British victory in Malaya in the late 1950s, for instance, obscures the roots 
that victory had in search-and-destroy operations, patrolling, force-on-force combat and 
also on displacement of large numbers of the population deemed possibly sympathetic to 
the insurgents.309  Close analysis of FM 3-24 reveals the verbatim and near-overlap with 
previous accounts of European colonial wars and accompanying “lessons learned.”  FM 
3-24, for instance, offers in part a verbatim recycling of Galula’s breakdown of population 
sympathies toward insurgent forces. Moreover, historical scholarship has expounded on 
the close association that torture and coercion enjoy with historical accounts of European 
colonial fighting.310   
In the sign of Russian and Chinese aggression in the year 2021, concepts such as 
“hybrid warfare” and “conflict in the grey zone” animate U.S. Department of Defense press 
 
308 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger 
Security International, 2006,) 53, Proquest. 
309 Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counter-Insurgency 44–47 for details 
on British army search-and-destroy operations in Malaya; 48–50 for details on the “Briggs Plan” which 
displaced and resettled hundreds of thousands of Chinese civilians deemed to be possible guerilla 
sympathizers; 58 for the resonance of British victory in Malaya within the U.S. military in relief against the 
defeat in Vietnam.  
310 Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War 116–117 on British 
paramilitary violence, reprisals, and coercion in Ireland after the First World War; 130 on large-scale 
counterinsurgent detention operations in Kenya in 1954; 135 on the incarceration and execution of Arab 
Revolt insurgents by British forces; 198–200 on French defeat in Algeria as tied to a losing colonial project 
anchored in minority rule, coercion, and torture; and 274–276 on the counterproductive nature of British 
Army imperial policing methods in Northern Ireland. See also Alistair Horne’s A Savage War of Peace, 
(New York: New York Review Books, 2006,) 204–205 for reflection on the ultimately self-defeating 
nature of French torture practices during the Algerian War.  
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releases.311 Detailed analysis and critique of discourse that frames Russian activity in 
Europe as “hybrid” and “grey zone” war is beyond the scope of this thesis.312 However, 
the research findings of this thesis suggest that those who endorse framing modern war in 
Europe along these conceptual lines would do well to consider the fact that, historically 
and as demonstrated in this thesis, U.S. military thought has tended to focus on the nature 
and means of battle and how to fight at the tactical and operational level and as carried out 
by the military, to the exclusion of the role of higher political purpose and reason, the scope 
of war aims, historical context, and the violence, fear, and anger that animates and 
influences war itself. Clausewitz speaks to these themes and more within his work, and the 
broader consideration of how the U.S. military mind and the record of war in Europe have 
interacted surely exercises the judgment of the mind regardless as to how the popular 







311 See Jim Garamone, “Military Must Be Ready to Confront Hybrid Threats, Intel Officer Says,” 
U.S. Department of Defense, September 4, 2019, 
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1952023/military-must-be-ready-to-confront-
hybrid-threats-intelligence-official-says/. See also Jim Garamone, “NATO Moves to Combat Russian 
Hybrid Warfare,” U.S. Department of Defense, September 29th, 2018, 
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1649146/nato-moves-to-combat-russian-hybrid-
warfare/.  
312 See Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside, “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War – 
Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 1 , Article 4, at 
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8092&context=nwc-review for one 
overview of the origins of the two phrases within U.S. defense discourse and the criticism that said 
discourse deviates from sound strategic thought. See pages 16–18 for the history of the emergence of the 
“hybrid warfare” concept within civilian academic and U.S. military discourse, to include several NPS 
theses, and 7–8 for the history of the introduction of the “gray zone” concept to the defense-intellectual 
establishment. 
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